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Mainstreaming is often seen as the new ‘trend’ in the governance of migrant integration in Europe. In the 
aftermath of the multiculturalism backlash (Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010) and the so-called 
assimilationist turn (Joppke and Morawska 2003), the governance of migrant integration is once again 
being revised. Although often interpreted and framed in very different ways in different (local, national, 
EU) policy settings, mainstreaming captures a ‘turn’ in integration governance at various levels, including 
the EU, the national and the local levels (Collett & Petrovic 2014; Van Breugel, Maan & Scholten, 2014). 
Mainstreaming is part of the European Common Basic Principles, but framed and applied very differently 
in national and local policies throughout Europe. For instance, whereas mainstreaming may involve 
interculturalist policies in cities like Barcelona and London, it is also used in a more narrow sense to refer 
to abandoning group-specific measures and government retrenchment in other cities such as Rotterdam 
and Paris. 
Mainstreaming is mostly known as a policy technique used in areas such as gender, disability or 
climate policies. However, less is known about the mainstreaming of immigrant integration policies. 
Mainstreaming refers to an amalgam of efforts to abandon target-group specific policy measures and to 
coordinate integration measures as an integral part of generic policies in domains such as education, 
housing and employment. In this regard, mainstreaming is about the substance of policy as well as about 
the coordination of those policies, in a way that is reminiscent of mainstreaming in other issue areas such 
as gender and disability. However, the precise meaning of mainstreaming, how it differs from other policy 
approaches, what is mainstreamed in the first place, why and when governments choose to mainstream 
their policies, and whether it is indeed more effective than other approaches, remains unclear. For 
instance, to what extent is mainstreaming more than yet another pendulum shift between specific and 
generic policies, as we have seen more often in integration policies over the past decades (see also 
Koopmans et al., 2005)? And is mainstreaming applied to all migrant categories, or are there categories 
for whom mainstreaming might be less appropriate? And, perhaps most importantly, is mainstreaming 
merely a fashionable policy innovation, or does it reflect the growing maturity of integration policy within 
governments? 
In  the  first  report  of  the  UPSTREAM  project,  a  more  precise  conceptualization  of mainstreaming 
immigrant integration governance was developed (Van Breugel, Maan & Scholten, 2014). In this project 
mainstreaming is understood as a shift toward generic policies oriented at a pluralist society and involving 
poly-centric forms of governance. This means that we do not follow how mainstreaming may be 
conceptualized in European, national or local policy discourses nor that we refer only to cases where the 
concept of mainstreaming is used explicitly: our study applies to all situations that fit our 
conceptualization of mainstreaming. 
For this conceptualization we connect the notion of mainstreaming to the literatures on diversity, 
super-diversity, interculturalism and poly-centric governance.  Several factors were identified in these 
literatures on how and why mainstreaming takes place. These factors will be explored in more detail in 
this report. Diversity literature claims that mainstreaming is a response to the growing scale of diversity 
as well as to the ‘diversification of diversity’; migration-related diversity has become so intense (especially 
in specific urban regions) that it is of relevance to all mainstream policies (Hollinger 1995, Vertovec 2007). 
Additionally, the growing number of migrant groups as well as their hyphenation over several generations 
make it increasingly difficult to speak about distinct migrant ‘minority groups.’ Interculturalism frames 
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mainstreaming as a response to the multiculturalism backlash, abandoning group-specific policies for a 
‘whole society’ approach aimed at inter-ethnic contact and defining a shared sense of belonging (Zapata 
Barrero 2015). Finally, the literature on poly-centric governance connects mainstreaming to the notion of 
multi-level governance; besides the continued relevance of national policies, European policies and 
especially local policies have become more pronounced over the last decade (Scholten 2013). 
This report, based on the second phase of the UPSTREAM project, focuses on the rationale of 
mainstreaming: what is mainstreamed to achieve immigrant integration, how have mainstreamed 
integration policies been developed in terms of policy processes, and why did governments decide to 
mainstream? The implementation and impact of mainstreaming will be the subject of subsequent work 
packages. Key questions in this study are: 
1.   What forms of mainstreaming can be identified? To what extent are migrant integration 
policies mainstreamed, and to what extent are other policy strategies preferred? 
 
2.   How have these mainstreaming policies come about? What factors have contributed to or 
obstructed the mainstreaming of integration governance? 
 
3.   Why has integration governance been mainstreamed (or not)? What explanations can be 
found for the mainstreaming of integration governance? How can differences between cases 
be explained? 
 
This report brings together the findings from France, Poland, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, 
Spain and the EU. The selected countries all have different governance structures in the domain of 
integration; the level of centralization differs, for example, between France, the Netherlands and the UK 
and there is a distinction between the ‘old’ immigration countries (such as France, the Netherlands and 
the UK) and the ‘new’ immigration countries (such as Poland). Also, a study was conducted on the 
mainstreaming of integration governance from the EU level. Within the country studies, the project looks 
at two cities that are selected on the basis of their differences in terms of integration policies (see table 
1) in addition to looking at the national level. 
 
Table 1: overview of cases in the UPSTREAM project 
 
Country City 1 City 2 
France Saint Denis Lyon 
The Netherlands Amsterdam Rotterdam 
Poland Warsaw Poznan 
The United Kingdom London-Southwark Bristol 
Spain Madrid Barcelona 
EU -- -- 
 
As mainstreaming speaks to the embedding of immigrant integration into generic policies it is required 
in methodological terms to not focus only on integration policy as an institutional policy domain per se. 
Therefore, we will focus on two policy areas in which immigrant integration policies usually play a key 
role: education and social cohesion. Obviously, the EU level study does not include a local-level analysis 
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but rather a more in-depth analysis of these two policy areas as embedded in various institutional actors 
at the EU level. 
The data collection consists of a literature review, complemented with around twenty semi-structured 
interviews per case. The literature review focused on policy documents, parliamentary and council 
records, reports of (advisory) research councils and secondary literature. These documents were analysed 
to search for references to aspects of mainstreaming as defined in our conceptualization in the previous 
stage of the project. The complementing interviews were conducted at national and city-level with policy-
makers across different institutions and departments, relevant civil-society stakeholders and experts from 
research councils. In total, 100 interviews were held (18 in the UK, 16 for the EU, 20 in France, 16 in the 
Netherlands, 20 in Spain and 10 in Poland). 
This report briefly outlines the main findings from the EU case, country cases and local cases in chapter 
2. The main focus of the report is on comparing these findings and drawing inferences on the three main 
questions in this report; what is mainstreamed, how does mainstreaming come about (assuming it does), 
and why do governments choose to adopt or reject mainstreaming. This comparison will be structured in 
accordance with the project’s conceptual and theoretical framework that will be outlined in some detail 
below. 
 
What? Mapping different forms of mainstreaming 
The first research question to be addressed in this report concerns what forms of mainstreaming can be 
identified in the case studies. To what extent is there evidence of mainstreaming according to our 
conceptualization of it? And what do governments attempt to achieve by mainstreaming, or when they 
avoid mainstreaming in favour of more specific and targeted policies. This question is addressed in this 
project through the ideal-typical model construed by Van Breugel, Maan and Scholten (2014). This 
typology (see figure 1) builds on the literature of diversity and super-diversity (Vertovec, 2007) on the one 
hand and on target group constructions on the other (Schneider and Ingram, 1994; Yanow & Van der Haar, 
2013). On one dimension, we distinguish between policies aimed at a monist society, based on an 
essentialist concept of ethnicity and core culture(s); and policies aimed at a pluralist society defined by 
diversity and the crossing and blurring of ethnic and cultural boundaries. A key question here is whether 
a model sees a culture, either a minority or majority culture, as something absolute and immobile or as 
something dynamic and flexible.  The other dimension, the policy targeting dimension (the ‘dilemma of 
recognition’), distinguishes between generic and specifically targeted policies. The key difference here is 
whether a model explicitly targets specific migrant groups or whether it targets the entire population. 
Following these two axes, four ideal-typical models of immigrant integration can be defined; 
differentialism, multiculturalism, assimilationism and interculturalism (see figure 1). Important is that for 
this study, following the literature on super-diversity and interculturalism, we hypothesize that 
mainstreaming will be primarily adopted as a policy strategy for achieving interculturalism. This reflects 
the conceptualization of mainstreaming as a shift from specific to generic policies, and an orientation 
towards the whole diverse society. However, whether this is so, or whether mainstreaming is adopted as 
a strategy for achieving very different modes of migrant integration (like assimilationism) is one of the 
questions that should be answered in this report. Also, we are very interested in the ‘routes’ that countries 
take before turning to mainstreaming, for instance whether mainstreaming constitutes a shift from 
assimilationism to interculturalism, from multiculturalism to interculturalism, or any other sequence of 
models that is theoretically possible. 











Based on this typology, this project has mapped the shifts in integration governance on the relevant 
dimensions. It is according to this theory-based strategy that we have attempted to uncover 
mainstreaming policy strategies, rather than a strategy based on the use of the notion of mainstreaming 
in practice. First, regarding policy targeting, we have mapped to what extent policies in the spheres of 
integration, education and social cohesion have been generic or specific. Specific policies are aimed at 
(migrant) target groups, whereas generic policies are aimed at the broader categories. This speaks to the 
notion of a ‘dilemma of recognition’, as phrased by De Zwart (2005): on the one hand, any form of socially 
constructing target groups will have inadvertent labelling or even stigmatizing effects, while on the other 
hand, generic policies leave policymakers no tools to deal with specific problems or inequalities (Yanow 
& Van der Haar, 2013, p.251). De Zwart (2005) describes three possible responses to the dilemma: 
accommodation, denial and replacement. Accommodation resembles multicultural politics: redistributive 
policies that accommodate the present group distinctions. Denial, on the other hand, fits assimilationist 
politics best. It argues against the benefits of redistributive policies and therefore does not target specific 
groups. Finally, replacement is seen as a compromise between the other responses: in this approach, the 
government constructs its own social categories, often taking the social problem as a starting point and 
framing it as being “more inclusive than the folk categories they replace” (De Zwart, 2005, p.140). 
Mainstreaming can be understood as a form of replacement when specific policies, aimed at 
migrant/ethnic/cultural groups are replaced by ‘proxies’, involving generic, colour-blind measures aimed 
at the entire population, while still addressing the same social problems. 
Secondly, we have mapped whether policies were oriented at promoting a form of cultural monism 
or rather at promoting pluralism. Whether mainstreaming is a tool for achieving monism or pluralism is, 
in this project, an empirical question. However, when speaking to the broader literature on (super-) 
diversity (e.g. Vertovec, 2007; Hollinger 1995), it is argued that the increased scale and scope of diversity 
makes mainstreaming inevitable. Due to successive flows of immigrants and the increasing internal 
diversity with regard to the first, second or third generation of immigrants, society has become so diverse, 
that constructing target groups based on a single variable such as ethnicity would be ineffective and 
sometimes even impossible. In addition to the dilemma of recognition, ‘recognizing’ would have become 
inherently difficult. It is theorized that the known national models of integration (e.g. Koopmans & 
Statham, 2000) and corresponding perspectives on cultural diversity, such as multiculturalism (e.g. 
Kymlicka, 2010; Vertovec & Wessendorf, 2010; Meer & Modood, 2012), assimilationism (e.g. Alba & Nee, 
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1997, 2005; Brubaker, 2001; Kivisto & Faist, 2010) and interculturalism (e.g. Wood, 2009; Bouchard, 2011; 
Cantle, 2012; Zapata Barrero, 2013), are not able to  cope  with  super-diversity  to  the  same  extent.  
Because of the  monist  perspective  on  the ‘mainstream society’   of   assimilationism   and   the   ‘groupist’   
perspective   of   multiculturalism, interculturalism seems to be the candidate most likely to adjust to the 
situation of super-diversity (VanBreugel, Maan & Scholten, 2014). 
Finally, in our conceptualisation of mainstreaming, we also draw attention to the governance 
implications that mainstreaming entails. We expect mainstreaming to go hand-in-hand with the move from 
state-centric modes of governance to poly-centric modes of governance, implying deconcentration and 
decentralisation in policy-making and responsibilities. Deconcentration refers to the sharing of 
responsibility for integration policy across various stakeholders, both governmental and non-state actors, 
whereas decentralisation refers to the multilevel coordination and sometimes also, multilevel dispersed 
responsibilities. State-centric models of integration tend to “oversimplify policies and overstress the 
alleged coherency and consistency of these policies” (Duyvendak & Scholten 2012, p.268). The national 
models are poorly equipped to respond to the increasing diversification and multi-level setting of today’s 
governments. The EU, the national level, local levels and sometimes even regional levels all have to 
coordinate the same topic, while “the divergent dynamics of agenda setting on these diverse levels can 
result in different ways in framing immigrant integration” (Scholten 2012, p.47). 
The key element when defining the mainstreaming of immigrant integration is the shift from specific 
targeted policies to generic policies. Following our typology as introduced in the preceding paragraphs, 
mainstreaming may either lead to assimilationism or interculturalism. The development of super-diverse 
societies may imply that more and more countries will adopt a pluralist mind-set, which would lead to 
interculturalist policies. However, whether this is actually the case is one of the questions to be addressed 
in this report. In addition, we expect mainstreaming to go hand-in-hand with a shift from state-centric to 
poly-centric (horizontal and vertical) governance, another expectation that will be reviewed in this report. 
 
How? Tracing the process that leads to mainstreaming (or not) 
The second question to be addressed in this report concerns ‘how’ and under what conditions 
mainstreaming has or has not taken place. In what context have immigrant integration policies been 
mainstreamed (or not)? This question refers primarily to mainstreaming as a policy process, focusing on 
the (types of) actors involved in this process, key turning-points in this process such as specific incidents, 
and contextual developments that have an effect on mainstreaming processes. 
To answer this question, this project will conduct a process tracing analysis. This process tracing is 
directly connected to the findings of the first part, focusing on ‘what’ is mainstreamed, and trying to 
account how these policies and measures have come about. This process tracing focuses on identifying 
actors that played a role in these processes, policy frames, and key events or developments that may have 
had an effect on the process. This involves an analysis of the following factors: 
-     Actors: which key actors played a role in the formulation of these policies? This may, for 
instance, include ministers, senior policy officials, non-state actors, local governments, certain 
political entrepreneurs, or expert advisory bodies. 
-     Policy frames: what rationale is given for the choice to mainstream integration policies? 
- Decision moments: what key decision moments can be identified when policies have been 
formalized or changed? 
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- Incidents: have there been incidents or relevant problem developments that have contributed 
to a framing/reframing of policies? 
 
Why? Accounting for why mainstreaming did (or did not) take place 
Finally, this report also addresses the question why governance bodies either choose to mainstream their 
integration policies, or decide not to do so. What is the underlying political rationale for mainstreaming? 
To answer this question, a conceptual-theoretical framework was developed based on Kingdon’s multiple 
streams approach (2003) to explaining policy processes. Kingdon distinguishes three ‘families of 
processes’ that, when conjured at specific moments by specific actors or events, can determine policy 
processes and dynamics. The streams he distinguishes are:  problem setting, policy context and political 
setting. These streams have different internal dynamics; but when the streams ‘conjure’, or when specific 
couplings are made between problems, policies and politics, policy change will be the result. This theory 
provides us with insight into policy-making process. However, some adjustments are necessary before we 
can use the theory in our specific study and policy-field. Overall, we are interested in elements that 
influence the decision regarding whether or not to mainstream. This is a combination of actual policy 
change as well as a question regarding the victory of generic policy proposals over specific policy proposals 
within the policy stream. 
Based on the conceptualization of mainstreaming (Van Breugel, Maan & Scholten, 2014), we will 
address a set of expectations regarding how and why mainstreaming will take place under specific 
circumstances. This includes expectations on how the problem setting (migration history, diversity, 
perceived integration issues), policy context (policy history, spin-offs from other areas, crisis or 
retrenchment) and political setting (politicization, populism, and individualisation) account for different 
mainstreaming strategies.  
Regarding the problem-context of policies, we expect that a longer migration history, both in different 
kinds of immigrants as well as internal generations and generally a greater degree of diversity are 
increasing the likelihood of mainstreaming integration policies being used. However, this likelihood is 
reduced when there are explicit and numerous perceived integration problems. Secondly, with respect to 
the policy context, we expect that mainstreaming immigrant integration will be stimulated by the extent 
of experience with mainstreaming in other policy domains (referring to cross-pollination between 
departments) and the increasing influence of the crisis and in the wake of governmental retrenchment. 
On the contrary, countries or departments that have a lot of experience with the use of specific policies 
may be less likely to switch to mainstreaming. Finally, increasing political and media attention and 
increasing populism around migration and integration debates make it more and more difficult to justify 
specific policies. Therefore, we expect that these elements from the political context will also be involved 
in the decision to mainstream. In this report, we will test these expectations in all cases studied and 
thereby answer to what extent certain developments, incidents, structures or political reasons form the 
rationale for the switch to mainstreaming immigrant integration as the new policy approach.  
In summary, throughout this comparative analysis, we will assess the following expectations: 
 
 
- Problem setting. Several problem trends may account for mainstreaming or other policy 
strategies from the typology of WP2. A general expectation from interculturalisation literature 
is that policies are more likely to be mainstreamed when the percentage of the population with 
a migrant background is relatively high, when migrant communities are relatively well 
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established (1st, 2nd and 3rd generations) and when there are many different migrant groups 
(described together as a situation of super-diversity). Furthermore, it has been argued in the 
literature that mainstreaming is less likely to the extent that problems associated with specific 
groups are more severe, whereas it may be more likely when the social position of migrants 
becomes more comparable/average. 
- Policy context. Some factors from the policy context may explain mainstreaming.  This includes 
the history of integration policies, previous experiences (positive or negative), institutional 
path-dependency that prevents change. Also there could be spin-offs from other policy fields 
where policy mainstreaming has been implemented (such as gender, disability). Finally, it is 
also necessary to address the influence of the financial crisis and government retrenchment on 
migrant integration policies (to what extent was mainstreaming caused by government 
cutbacks and retrenchment). 
-     Political setting. We may expect some political factors to promote or inhibit mainstreaming. 
For instance, it has been argued in the literature that politicization and mediatisation would 
promote the tendency toward more generic colour-blind policies, whereas group-specific 
policies would be more likely to emerge in depoliticized settings. The same may apply for 
populism and the rise of anti-immigrant parties; such parties inhibit group-specific policies and 
may see mainstreaming as a means for achieving assimilationism (rather than interculturalism). 
Finally, when the (political/public) perception of society is more individualized (less 
communitarianist), it can be expected that parties are more likely to support the 
mainstreaming of integration policies; more communitarianist politics, is less likely to support 




Guide to the report 
After this introduction, chapter 2 first answers the ‘what’ questions for the different case studies. We 
will emphasize several characteristics and patterns regarding the three elements of mainstreaming in 
the national and local cases and separately for the EU. 
Subsequently, in chapter 3, we will compare the case studies for all three central questions: what was 
mainstreamed, how, and why? What generic inferences can be drawn in terms of ‘what’ is mainstreamed 
across Europe, and what patterns emerge between the different local, country and EU cases? How does 
this speak to the typology of mainstreaming; is mainstreaming indeed a tool for achieving interculturalism, 
or is it something different? And is there a pattern between the cases in terms of how mainstreaming did 
or did not come about; what actors, frames, decision moments and focus events were key to this process? 
And finally, can we explain the choice to mainstream using the expectations formulated earlier? 
Finally, the report is concluded in chapter 4, looking at the implications of the outcomes of this study 
for the developed conceptual framework and looking ahead to the implications of the findings for the 
following stage of the project; studying the street-level implementation of mainstreaming immigrant 
integration (UPSTREAM work package 4). 
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2. Mainstreaming in Europe 
 
 
This chapter summarizes the findings from the country and EU cases on the mainstreaming of integration 
governance. It primarily addresses the ‘what’ question in the context of this project: what is 
mainstreamed in terms of integration governance?  Addressing the conceptualization of what 
mainstreaming means (as discussed in chapter 1), the case descriptions will be structured according to 
whether generic or specific policies have been identified, whether policies were aimed at monism or 
pluralism, and whether mainstreaming was associated with state-centric or poly-centric modes of 
governance. Per case, we will focus as much as possible on general mainstreaming trends, bringing 
together findings for the domains of immigrant integration, education and social cohesion, and from the 
various levels involved in this project. The material that is presented in this chapter is based on the 
original country and EU-reports that are published on the project website.1 
The case studies described in this chapter will provide the basis for the comparative analysis in chapter 
3. In this context, it is important to reiterate that this project follows a dissimilar case study design. Not 
only the city cases per country, but also the countries have been selected to represent a sample that is 
dissimilar in terms of factors that are relevant to this project: problem setting, policy context and political 
context. It includes countries that have a relatively long history of immigration (France, the UK, the 
Netherlands), as well as new immigration countries (Spain, Poland). It includes countries with very 
different models of integration, including more accommodating traditions (the UK, Spain) as well as more 
assimilationist traditions (France, recently also the Netherlands, to some extent Poland). In terms of 
political context, it includes countries where migrant integration has been fiercely contested in the 
political arena (France, the Netherlands, to some extent the UK), as well as countries where this issue still 
has a relatively low political profile (Spain, Poland). Finally, the project also includes a separate study of 
the EU level, as a level that is of increasing relevance to migrant integration in general and that more 
specifically has played an important role in promoting mainstreaming as a common basic principle of 
integration. 
2.1      European Union 
 
Due to its structure as a supra-national union, the European Union is typically in a delicate power- 
balance with the sovereignty of its Member States. With regard to immigrant integration the European 
Union has no official legislative competence and, equally the European Commission has no enforceable 
agenda or clear mandate in this field. However as migration policies are a European competence, 
immigrant integration has been on the European Agenda since 19992 as a logical corollary to (legal) 
migration policy. Since then the European Union and Commission have published several guidelines and 
advising principles on the matter. With the Common Basic Principles on Integration as published in 2004, 
and a year later the Common Agenda for Integration, the EU gained a “quasi-competence” (Petrovic and 
Collet 2014: p. 5) on integration. These publications can also be considered as the introduction of the 
term mainstreaming in the context of immigrant integration (at the EU level)3. 
Policy and legislative responsibilities are typically divided between the Directorate General for 
Home Affairs (DG Home) and other related DG's such as Education and Culture (EAC), Employment and 
                                                          
1
 See www.project-upstream.eu 
2
 




 Later also addressed in the Second Handbook on Integration (2007), the Integration Indicators (2011) and most recently “framed 
as a ‘holistic approach’ under the Greek Presidency of the European Council (2014)” (Petrovic and Collet: 2014: p.3) 
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Social Affairs (EMPL) and Justice (JUST). While DG Home typically targets newly arrived ‘third country 
nationals’, the other DGs target EU-citizens in general, only touching on integration issues in a later 
stage of the immigrant's residence in the European Union, generally labelled as issues of ‘social 
inclusion’. Like immigrant integration, education policy is limited to soft, intergovernmental EU policy- 
making, with common standards in education policy, “identifying education and training as key 
pathways to a ‘knowledge economy’, and core for the attainment of the EU’s overall objectives related to 
full employment, economic reform and social inclusion, as now covered under the EU2020 agenda” 
(Petrovic and Collet 2014: p.14). 
 
Monist/Pluralist 
Integration policy at European level has not followed a specific model, although traces of 
interculturalist ideas can be traced within the Common Basic Principles and the ‘two way process’ of 
integration.   Whilst harder to recognize in other policy fields, education is typified by a strong 
recognition of diversity. “The main reason for this may be that education is less contentious at EU level, 
because the EU institutions have little to say in this policy matter" (Petrovic and Collet 2014: p.21). The 
DG for Education supported research on (e.g.) intercultural approach in education (Eurydice 2004), the 
2008 green paper on inclusive school approach and the 2012 SIRIUS research and policy network 
focused on the education of children with a migrant background emphasizing an inclusive lens in 
education. Social inclusion within education and training is also emphasized in the EU2020 framework. 
All these measures and initiatives emphasize the diversity and plurality of its students. 
 
General/Specific 
While education policies and programs explicitly address (ethnic) diversity, social cohesion policies are 
phrased in more generic terms, grouped together under vulnerable or marginal groups. “Social 
inclusion policy at EU level takes on a needs-based or barriers-based approach, looking at specific 
challenges such as unemployment, poverty, age (both young and old), gender (underrepresentation), 
exclusion or non-participation” (Petrovic and Collet 2014: p.31). These are linked to the EU2020 targets 
focused on reducing unemployment and poverty. 
While mainstreaming at the EU level was introduced as a multi-stakeholder engagement to 
stimulate shared responsibility for integration policies, it now risks becoming a mean to dilute and side-
line the issue. “According to some experts, the Netherlands have been quite influential in promoting 
their national discourse at the EU level, making it increasingly difficult to discuss targeted measures for 
immigrants at all” (Petrovic and Collet 2014: p.10).  
 
State-centric/Poly-centric 
As a supra-national political body the European Union and Commission typically operate in a polycentric 
way, primarily working with national governments. These operate in a delicate balance. As only few 
Member States (namely the ‘old’ immigration countries) had formal integration policies in the early 
2000s, there was a ‘momentum’ for the European Commission to take the lead on framing a common 
approach to integration policy. “However, as national expertise has grown in this area, so has the desire 
to minimize the EU’s oversight. As a result, EU integration policy has not developed significantly as a 
policy area over the past ten years, including the concept of mainstreaming” (Petrovic and Collet 2014: 
p. 13). 
Within the European Union the different DGs target respectively newly arrived ‘third country 
nationals’ (DG Home) and EU-citizens in general (other DGs).   This differentiation in scope and 
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mandate,  and  subsequently  the  diverging  policy-priorities  and objectives,  have  proven  to  be  a 
challenge in mainstreaming immigrant integration policies as policies are typically not coordinated 
across DGs (Petrovic and Collet 2014: p.3). Social inclusion of vulnerable groups, for example is framed 
in generic terms covering integration as one of its dimensions, and could be regarded as a 
mainstreamed approach. However as a politically sensitive topic and subordinate to other economic- 
crisis related priorities the topic is virtually absent (p.8, p.31), illustrating the risk of mainstreaming 
when integration policies are not coordinated or supported sufficiently across DGs. 
 
Conclusion 
While integration policy was put on the European agenda as an extension of legal migration policy, “it is  
becoming less  and  less  sustainable  as  a  siloed policy  area”  (Petrovic  and  Collet  2014:  p.13). 
Mainstreaming was subsequently introduced to stimulate shared responsibility and engagement in 
issues of integration, however, there is currently little momentum towards broadening out the 
integration portfolio. This carries the risk of dismantling integration policies. “Despite the framing of 
guidelines and a common approach, Member States still retain complete competence over integration 
policy, and believe in a limited role for the EU, according to the principle of subsidiarity” (p.13). It is in 
this politicised field that the polycentric policy making of the European Union operates. 
 
2.2      United Kingdom 
 
 
Immigration is an old phenomenon for British society. Immigration trajectories have long been closely 
entwined with the British colonial history, with the New Commonwealth countries, South Asia and the 
West Indies as main sending countries. During the 1970s and 1980s, more Asian and African migrants 
arrived and the share of asylum seekers, economic migrants and migration increased as a consequence 
of EU policies related to the free movement of labour. More recently the UK has experienced an 
increase in short-term and circular migration. The biggest issue on both the past and present political 
agenda is the wish to restrict immigration, especially the increasing CEE-migration, and the possibilities 
for doing so. Restricting immigration by setting strict borders is, however, complemented by equality 
policies for migrants within the borders, resulting in an oxymoronic approach to immigration and 
integration. 
 
Bristol and London-Southwark 
A port city with 432,000 inhabitants, Bristol is by far the biggest city in south-western England. With 
88% of the 2001 population categorised as White British, Bristol was at par with the English average, 
with small pockets of well-established Afro-Caribbean and Pakistani minority populations. But the 
period 2001-11 has seen a significant increase in the Black African population, from 2.3% to 6.0%, as 
well as an increase in the number of Eastern European immigrants, with the White British population 
declining to 78% of the total. Of particular significance is the increasing Somali population, with Bristol 
having the second-biggest Somali-born population in the UK in 2011 (after London). The increase in 
immigration over the past 10 years has, together with pressure on the housing stock, resulted in a 
changing residential geography of Bristol’s BME population, with more immigrants moving into 
traditional white working class areas away from the city centre, in particular in northern Bristol. In the 
late 1990s, deprived parts of Bristol were targeted through neighbourhood renewal initiatives, but 
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since 2007, community engagement has been designed to include neighbourhood partnerships as the 
main vehicle for consultation and dialogue at the local level. 
Southwark is an inner-city London borough with a total population of 293,000 in 2011. 
Whereas the White British proportion of the population has been declining, from 52% in 2001 to 39% 
in 2011 (similar to the overall London trend), the Black population has remained stable, at 27% of the 
total 2011 population, but twice the London average. Southwark borough is characterized by significant 
ethnic/racial and socio-economic divides.  Formerly a white working class area, Northern Southwark 
has seen significant post-industrial changes, with the former docklands being converted into expensive 
housing units. At the same time a steep increase in the immigrant population has led to tensions over 
access to social housing. Central Southwark has been a destination for immigrants since WW2, and the 
proliferation of difference has led to neighbourhoods here being characterized as super-diverse. Under 
New Labour (1997-2010), many deprived areas in Southwark were targeted through resource-intensive 
neighbourhood renewal programmes. But austerity measures have, since 
2010, resulted in retrenchment of public services, and community councils, held at neighbourhood 
level, now represent ‘universal’ platforms for community engagement. In addition, community 




At the national level, a pluralist perspective prevails; however, monist approaches are also 
recognisable. For a long time, migrants were seen as ethnic minorities rather than migrants. Only in the 
1960s was a start made to implement integration policies rather than de facto assimilationist policies. 
In the policy response to the London 2005 terrorist bombings, Secretary of State at the DCLG Ruth Kelly, 
explicitly cited Vertovec (2007) to describe the uneven geography of super-diversity in Britain. 
Consequently, the concept of super-diversity was central to drafting the new guidelines for the 
management of diversity at the local governance level and establishing new funding streams. Although 
the ‘British mix’ has become increasingly diverse, discussions are still ongoing to describe Britain as a 
multi-faith society rather than a multicultural society. In addition, the approach to strong borders is 
often accompanied by quotes such as ‘British jobs for British workers’ and increasing attention is being 
paid in education to the ‘common island history’, British norms and values, and British literature. In 
other words, an assimilationist perspective co-exists with the awareness and recognition of a diverse 
population. 
The often known ‘British’ multiculturalist model was actually developed unevenly and mostly 
locally and implemented without national support since 1985. Subsequently, 2001 marked a 
multiculturalist backlash at the national level among others by requiring avoidance of group-specific 
funding and translations into languages other than English. However, at the local level we can still 
recognize lingering multicultural practices and a more prominent pluralist mind-set. The proliferation 
of differences is expressed most in super-diverse small inner-city areas with long histories of migration 
settlement. London Southwark is one example of these super-diverse areas. Increasingly, the borough 
is noticing that there is no straightforward correlation between ethnicity and language proficiency or 
between BME status and social deprivation. An observation that Bristol can confirm since the socio-
economic diversity within their BME population is also considerable. Over all, London Southwark 
emphasizes that diversity is the norm, and a positive characteristic, celebrating its high levels of 
diversity rather than problematizing it. 




British integration policies of the last ten years are hard to box into the ideal typical models of 
integration. In the late 1990s a neighbourhood renewal policy frame [NRP] was prominent. This frame 
reflected the localism agenda and the wish to address inner-city deprivation. Its main goal was to bend 
mainstream instruments to intensively intervene in deprived areas. Whereas this area-based approach 
disproportionally benefited minority populations, this was not the original intention since targets were 
identified on the basis of deprivation indicators rather than ethnic, racial or migrant statuses of the 
area. A community cohesion approach was implemented parallel to the NRP frame, consisting of 
assimilationist, differentialist and interculturalist elements which were hardly ever specifically 
targeting immigrants. The Ethnic Minority Achievement Grant, once implemented as a ring-fenced 
budget enabling schools to narrow achievement gaps and to fund additional support for bilingual 
learners and under-achieving ethnic minorities, was mainstreamed into the Dedicated Schools Grant 
in April 2011. In addition, the explicit ring-fencing of budgets for EAL provision (English as Additional 
Language) was removed. Instead, a pupil premium was introduced that was connected to an indicator 
of social deprivation rather than heritage. This would exemplify the use of generic approaches to meet 
the needs of specific groups who are being left behind, without compromising the principle of localism. 
Finally, the social mobility agenda has been implemented increasingly often since 2012. It addresses 
socio-economic inequalities within mainstream policies, thereby providing a good example of 
mainstreaming. 
At the local level, London Southwark shows similarities with the national social inclusion 
agenda, emphasizing the improvement of mainstream services to address socio-economic inequalities, 
often targeting age-defined categories. In addition, the inclusion of children in mainstream learning 
processes is emphasized while providing resources for interventions addressing the needs and 
opportunities of individual children. Bristol’s start of the community cohesion framework consisted of 
initiatives specifically targeting immigrant and BME communities. Although this specific focus has 
shifted significantly since then, Bristol still runs an English as Additional Language unit, at request of the 
schools, and also provides several specific measures which are (amongst others) focused on fighting 
racism and supporting Roma children. Additionally, Bristol is committed to the provision of ESOL as key 
component in access to the rights and responsibilities of citizenship. 
 
State-centric/Poly-centric 
Responsibility for migrants and integration has typically fallen within two departments: the Home 
Office is charged with immigration and border control and the Department for Communities and Local 
Government (DCLG) is in charge of community cohesion. The principle of localism, connected to 
projects such as government through community and the neighbourhood renewal program, has had a 
strong influence on the early development of decentralized government in Britain. Since 2010, there has 
also been a perceivable increase in deconcentration. The emergence of the Big Society philosophy, 
increasingly addressing citizens’ social responsibilities, and the 2012 policy framework for integration 
“Creating the Conditions for Integration” (by the DCLG) are important turning points for increasing 
governmental retrenchment. Civil society was inspired and stimulated to address issues that are 
important to them, instead of large-scale, centrally led and state-funded programs. This approach is 
also recognisable at the local level. For example, the Bristol corporate plan 2014-2017 uses a 
mainstream approach emphasizing inequalities of health, wealth and opportunity and includes public 
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consultations and partnerships with civil society organizations, businesses and local universities. Finally, 
the trend of deconcentration is also recognisable in the connection between the state and schools. 
Schools received more responsibilities and the requirements to target the needs of specific groups 
were reduced. However, in connection to the assimilationist wishes, the school curriculum was 
centralized to increase attention to British elements of history and language. 
 
Conclusion 
The pluralist perspective is more prominent at the city level, which could be a consequence of the 
manifestation of super-diversity in those areas. Whereas the pluralist perspective is also recognisable 
at the national level, this is often complemented with a monist, assimilationist, perspective focussing 
on British people, values, history and language. The community cohesion framework on integration 
combines elements of assimilationism, differentialism and interculturalism often without focussing 
explicitly on immigrants. Additionally, the neighbourhood renewal frame, social mobility frame and big 
society frame all focus on bending mainstream institutions to address socio-economic inequalities. Area-
based approaches targeting social deprivation areas are a preferred policy tool in these frames as well 
as the growing use of poly-centric governance, especially deconcentration. Some of these frames 
originate in the 90’s, which means that mainstreaming is not a new, but an increasingly used policy 
technique in the UK. 
2.3      The Netherlands 
 
The Netherlands has a long history of migration, with a diversity of migrants coming from the former 
colonies, guest workers recruited from Southern-Europe and North-Africa, refugees and EU mobile 
workers. Based on the idea of 'proportional participation' the Dutch government keeps a close track of 
immigrant participation in different fields. The Netherlands has an advanced statistical database, which 
in its data collection distinguishes between allochtoon and autochtoon citizens: those born abroad or 
whose parents were born abroad and native Dutch. Studies on so-called 'third generation' migrants are 
also conducted. Originating in Dutch multicultural immigrant integration policies these statistics have 
played an undiminished role in policymaking since the 'assimilationist turn' in the early 
2000s and policy-developments since then. 
The diversification of diversity applies perhaps most to the two major cities of the Netherlands 
Amsterdam (811.185 inhabitants4) and Rotterdam (619.826 inhabitants5) that have received the most 
immigration over the past decades. Both cities are highly diverse, with immigrants – including a large 
cohort of second and third generation migrants − making up over 50% of the population. Amsterdam 
politics are considered rather stable with a long tradition of multicultural policies. Immigrant 
integration in Rotterdam on the other hand is often perceived as being a more contested topic, strongly 
influenced by the local right-wing party of Liveable Rotterdam (Leefbaar Rotterdam). In general, 
Rotterdam is known for its pioneering policies, for example in the field of social and housing policies. 
Social cohesion and well-being policies in Rotterdam for a long time had a rather informal 
character, aimed at the support of minorities or immigrants through specific projects by an emphasis 
on cultural expressions and role models. The electoral victory of the local populist party Liveable 
Rotterdam in 2002 can be considered the local expression of the backlash against multiculturalism. 
                                                          
4
 Retrieved august 13, 2014, from  http://www.iamsterdam.com/nl-NL/experience/over-amsterdam/feiten-en-cijfers  
5
 Gemeente Rotterdam (2014). Feitenkaart Bevolkingsmonitor juli 2014. Rotterdam: Gemeente Rotterdam.  
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Since then immigrant integration has been high on the agenda, marking a transition to restrictive and 
more normative integration policies after years of labour led coalitions. Instead of the dialogue and 
connection that were previously central to immigrant integration, the policies from then on centred on 
the immigrants’ own responsibility for 'their' problems with integrating. In practice, this cooperation 
with many migrant self-organizations continued for a long time, only breaking down years later under 
financial pressure (and larger administrative reforms). So despite being framed in strong terms, 
categorical policies and financial support continued for a long time, illustrating that political pressure 
is perhaps only the first step towards putting these reforms on the agenda. 
In contrast to the turbulent political context of Rotterdam, Amsterdam has a fairly stable 
political climate, with a long tradition of Social-Democrat (Partij van de Arbeid) rule in the City Hall. In 
this setting, immigrant integration policies have been less contested than in Rotterdam, characterized 
by multicultural policies with a strong emphasis on emancipation. In 2004 however, the city was 
shocked by the sudden murder of filmmaker and columnist Theo van Gogh by a radicalized second 
generation Dutch-Moroccan. This put segregation, polarization and radicalization on the map, changing 
the outlook on integration in Amsterdam. While diversity had always been taken for granted in 
Amsterdam policies, it now became a contested topic that required active interference by the local 
government, linking diversity and integration policies to polarization and radicalization. 
In the period that followed, generic citizenship policies started to dominate the local Dutch 
immigrant integration debate. Rotterdam took a lead in this. Between 2006 and 2014 it was citizenship 
rather than integration that was on the agenda, along with a strong focus on social cohesion, 
participation or bonding. Integration and migration were either completely absent in this period, or 
“reformulated in terms of safety issues” (Van Ostaijen & Scholten, 2014). One exception here is the 
special program for Antillean migrants, the ‘Antillean approach’ (see a.o. De Boom, Van San, 
Weltevrede & Hermus, 2009; Burgemeester en Wethouders [B&W] Rotterdam, 2009c). When 
compared to the national level and to Rotterdam, the actual move away from integration policies to 
citizenship and diversity policies came rather late in Amsterdam, around 2010 (B&W Amsterdam, 
2003). Although self-organizations are not supported as such, financial support is available on the basis 
of projects (Ham & Van der Meer, 2012). The citizenship and diversity department takes on an active 
role in bringing projects and organizations together.  Despite the generic approach Amsterdam also 
took part in the Antilleans and the Moroccans-approach, although the latter is framed in generic-youth 
terms and social-economic background (2012). While coordinated at the city level, many immigrant 
integration policies are executed at the district level. 
 
Monist/Pluralist 
Typified by its multicultural policies, the first Dutch ‘minority’ policies in the eighties were drafted in a 
pluralist perspective on society, targeting immigrants separately as to emancipate them within their 
respective groups. It was the assimilationist turn in the early 2000s that shifted the focus from 
structural integration to social and cultural integration, rephrasing this in a generic message of social 
cohesion. This entailed a stronger emphasis on cultural adaptation, shifting in the direction of a monist 
perspective on society. A number of incidents nationally and internationally led to a further 
politicization of the topic. Newly founded populist parties such as LPF, Liveable Rotterdam and the 
Freedom Party placed the topic high on the political agenda. Whilst plurality and diversity can once 
more be discerned in immigrant policies between 2005 and 2011, the Cabinet explicitly distanced itself 
from the “relativism enclosed in the concept of the  multicultural society”  in 2011.  Stating that 
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increased pluriformity and diversity do not automatically lead to shared norms, but that this instead 
requires effort on the part of those who come to settle here indicates a shift to a more monist view on 
integration. The Integration Agenda (2013) of the current government continues the focus on "Dutch 
society and its values" (Aanbiedingsbrief Agenda Integratie 2013) and strives for equal treatment of all 
its citizens. 
In the field of education diversity and pluralism are a constant, and are therefore perceived 
as a fact that simply has to be dealt with or as something that should be actively 'experienced' and 
stimulated, supporting a pluralist stance on society and education. Throughout time the amount of 
attention paid to specific problems of immigrant integration in education has diminished. The field of 
social cohesion policies is mostly decentralized and strongly informed by diversity at the local level. 
Specifically in the 'citizenship programs' (replacing most immigrant integration policies in Rotterdam 
since 2007 and in Amsterdam since 2010) are based on a plural notion of society and the population. 
In the cities of Amsterdam and Rotterdam mainstreaming is considered 'inevitable' as specific policies 




In 2004 the increased diversity amongst immigrant groups led to the consideration that group policies 
are not useful, initiating a shift to generic policies. In 2011, this was taken a step further as under the 
motto ‘future over descent’, policies were centred around individuals rather than groups. Overall, we 
see a shift in emphasis here from specifically targeted emancipatory policies in the 1980s to the 
accessibility of generic policies today. This development is characterized by a move from a multicultural 
approach to recognition of increased diversity and individualization of targeting on the one hand, and 
general decentralisations in the social sector on the other. 
In education, specific instruments, such as the system for additional funding for schools, are 
being replaced by instruments targeting by the parents’ level of education, an example of a needs- 
based proxy in integration governance. Overall, social cohesion policies are mostly phrased in generic 
terms that target neighbourhoods mainly by income, or address everyone on a city level as citizens of 
that city. In Rotterdam the move to generic policies was strongly informed by a move away from the 
previous more assimilationist period 
 
State-centric/Poly-centric 
Along with general decentralisations and austerity measures much of the policy responsibility for 
integration has been decentralized to lower levels of governance. The move from separate immigrant 
integration policies to generic policies also entails a narrowing down of the field to civic integration 
courses and re-migration policies. In 2011 it was announced that the budget for immigrant integration 
will be reduced to zero by 2015. 
For education both the national government and municipalities are increasingly considered as 
directors, facilitators and information providers, rather than actual policy makers, with much 
policymaking taking place at school-level. Housing and social cohesion policies are typically being 
decentralized to the local and even neighbourhood level. The case of Rotterdam illustrates the need 
for a coordinated approach to address issues of immigrant integration under generic and de- 
concentrated policies (responsibilities). There, a move to generic policies initially meant a complete 
absence of immigrant integration issues in any of the policy fields. 




Departing from the multicultural immigrant integration policies of the 1980s, the Netherlands 
experienced an assimilationist turn in the early 2000s. It is in this move to generic policies that 
developments of mainstreaming can be recognized. In the national discourse this seems to be heavily 
focused on a move away from integration policies, or at least from framing them as such. At the local 
level this seems to be more informed by pluralism, where mainstreaming follows as an inevitable 
consequence of increased diversity. However, this does not automatically result in a coordinated 
approach to integration. 
 
2.4      Poland 
 
Poland is a net-emigration country that expects to become a net-immigration country by 2020. In the 
past, several waves of population change have been experienced, such as the changes in population 
after World War II, during the communist regime and the emigration of Jews after the anti-Semitic 
campaign of 1968. Nowadays, immigration to Poland consists for the greater part of short-term 
immigrants (e.g. seasonal and circular workers) who are not regarded as residents. Another immigrant 
group not perceived as immigrants are the so-called ‘traditional minorities’; groups of people that 
inhabited a particular territory for at least 100 years. Refugees are primarily considered as immigrants. 
Most refugees are Chechens, who allegedly often use Poland as a transit country to travel further west. 
Overall, the percentage of long-term ‘immigrants’ is so low, that if they would all reside in Warsaw, 
they would still only form 3% of the city’s population. This low percentage of immigrants and the lack of 
visible challenges concerning immigrant integration have resulted in the virtual absence of immigrant 
integration in the political debate and media discourse and a general ‘lack of interest’ in immigrant 
integration. Consequently, supporting integration and preventing ethnic discrimination are relatively 
new policy fields. 
 
Warsaw and Poznań 
Two main differences between the selected Polish cities can be identified. The first reflects the scale 
of immigration. According to some estimations, Warsaw is inhabited by 45 thou foreigners, 25% of the 
entire foreign/immigrant population in Poland and 2.5% of the entire population of the capital city. 
However, the ‘real’ numbers are difficult to estimate due to the predominantly temporary character of 
immigration to Warsaw. According to the Office of the Capital City of Warsaw, at the end of 2013, 
there were only 18,349 foreigners registered there. When it comes to Poznań, the numbers are also 
blurred. Michał Buchowski and Jacek Schmidt estimate that foreigners constitute between 1% - 1.5% 
of the city’s population of more than 500,000 (see: Buchowski, Schmidt 2012: 11). This influences the 
numbers of foreign pupils in both cities' schools - over 1000 in Warsaw and less than 200 in Poznań. 
The authorities of the Capital City of Warsaw seem much more aware of possible issues 
related to cultural diversity in the fields of education and social cohesion than the authorities of the 
City of Poznań. It is reflected in the Capital City's educational programs, such as, The Program of 
Development of Education in Warsaw in the Years 2013-2020 and the Educational Policy of the City of 
Warsaw for the years 2008 - 2012; or the social programs, such as: the Social Strategy of Warsaw – 
Strategy for Solving Social Problems for the years 2009 – 2010 and Diverse Warsaw (2011 - 2013, 
extended to 2014). Neither the 2006 Educational Policy of the City of Poznań report, nor the 
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Development Strategy of the City of Poznań to 2030’ (2010) mention migration, diversity or 
heterogeneity. 
Another striking difference between the two cases is their level of NGO-ization. There are over 
10 immigrant and refugee or pro-immigrant and pro-refugee organizations in Warsaw, which provide 
legal and language assistance, publish their reports and recommendations and advocate migrant 
causes in other ways. There is no such group in Poznań, apart from the Migrant Info Point, which 
opened in 2013 and provides practical advice to foreigners. This seems to reflect the difference in the 
general numbers of NGOs in the two cities. 
 
Monist/Pluralist 
After the Second World War, during the communist period, silencing the issue of ethnic minorities and 
diversity as well as attempts to create (the illusion of) a homogenous nation state served as a pillar of 
the state and its new territory. Nowadays, there is still little attention paid to cultural diversity, even 
though sixty percent of the long-term immigrant residents in Poland is represented by four ethnic 
groups: Ukrainians (31%), Vietnamese (11%), Russians (10%, including Chechens) and Byelorussians 
(9%). Due to the low number of immigrants, the few places of origin and the absence of multiple 
generations (except for traditional minorities), Poland cannot be classified as super-diverse. In addition, 
the Polish government treats the ‘traditional minorities’ (such as the Germans) as cultural communities 
on their own, reemphasizing the Polish monist perspective on society. 
At the local level we can recognize some attempts to propagate the cities’ limited diversity. For 
example, Warsaw launched the project ‘Diverse Warsaw’, to promote non-discrimination and tolerance 
towards diversity, and Poznan participated in the global ‘Open Cities’ project and mentioned 
‘tolerance and openness to other cultures’ in the city’s candidacy for the 2016 European Capital of 
Culture. However, this attention for diversity is very limited and is not extended to general, educational 
or social cohesion-focused policies. 
 
General/Specific 
Overall, Poland’s immigrant integration policies can be described as partly non-existent and partly a 
mixture of differentialist and multiculturalist policies. Anti-discrimination and social policies apply to 
immigrants without specifically mentioning them, while some social policies are explicitly excluded for 
holders of a temporary residence permit. These policies do not reflect a deliberate decision-making 
process with regard to the position of immigrants. Multicultural and differentialist elements can mainly 
be recognized in education, in which students may follow additional Polish lessons if they have language 
difficulties, take cultural and linguistic classes in their mother tongue or attend international classes. The 
latter are organized and co-funded by the home countries and are allowed to provide their own 
curriculum in their own language. Difficulties however arise when arriving at the final exam, which is 
identical to the exam taken by all other Polish schools. Other more differentialist policies apply to the 
‘traditional minorities’, which are entitled to benefits such as education in their mother tongue (used 
by +/- 36.000 children in 2005/2006), the introduction of bilingual inscriptions in public places and the 
right to preserve languages and traditions. 
The municipality of Warsaw has not implemented any other specific policies focused on 
immigrant integration in the light of social cohesion, besides the project ‘Diverse Warsaw’. More 
specific measures  are  implemented  in education,  including the  establishment  of an advisor for 
educating foreign children and assistants for Roma children and establishing several centres of 
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excellence regarding immigrant topics. In Poznan, on the other hand, issues concerning diversity and 
migration are not mentioned at all in policies regarding education and (social) long-term strategies. The 
city does refer to the demographic situation (population decline, migration imbalance) as a crucial issue 




NGOs play a major role both at the national and local levels in Polish immigrant integration policy. By 
using EU-funds (such as EFI), Poland is obliged to accept and fulfil the agenda, not directly as a state but 
as organizations and institutions dealing with integration issues. At the national level, the NGOs support 
this by working out recommendations about integration policies and how to coordinate them. At a local 
level, the city governments cooperate with and delegate to NGOs that represent migrants and their 
interest. Therefore, decision-making is not only dispersed across the national and local levels, but also 
between governmental and non-governmental entities at the local level. However, horizontal sharing of 
policy-responsibility at the national level is minimal, due to the non-addressing of immigrant integration. 
Overall, the governance of immigrant integration is more state-centric than poly-centric. 
 
Conclusion 
Identifying and classifying the Polish approach to mainstreaming is made difficult by the general lack 
of immigrant integration policies or interest therein. Overall, emigration and immigrant reception are 
much higher on the agenda than immigrant integration. Due to the inexperience with integration and 
its small scale, we cannot yet speak of ‘shifts’ in Polish policies. The scale and history of immigration 
in Poland can, depending on the specific situation, work either in favour of or against the development 
of mainstreaming strategies. When not specifically considered, immigrants are mainstreamed in 
generic policies without much consideration, such as in the case of social cohesion policies. However, 
with regard to education, Poland has arranged many specific, differentialist and multiculturalist policies 
with regard to language and assistance, although these topics are more extensively developed locally 
(Warsaw) than nationally. Differences in the experienced scale of immigration between the national 
government and Warsaw may lead to insufficient provisions for immigrants being made at the national 
level, which in turn may make it difficult for local authorities to adequately respond to the needs of 
immigrants or to the translation of unconsidered or unintended national mainstreaming into local 
activities targeting specific migrant groups. 
2.5      France 
 
France is one of the countries that can be defined as an old immigration country. Several waves of 
immigration have taken place since the mid-19th century, in which many immigrants with different 
countries of origin and different motives (i.e. work or family-reunification) came to France. 
Consequently, France has characteristics of a super-diverse society in terms of countries of origin and 
different generations. However, this super-diversity is hardly represented in the statistics, since the 
French statistical system has not introduced categories related to ethnicity and origins. Descendants of 
immigrants and especially the third generation are therefore practically invisible. This non- registration 
approach is a consequence of the French Republican strand of universalism with regard to immigrant 
integration. The republican principle of equality is interpreted as rejection of any form of recognition 
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of groups defined along origins and ethnic lines which led consequently to colour-blind policies. 
Therefore, integration policies in France consist mainly of reception policies and anti- discrimination 
policies.  
 
Lyon and Saint Denis 
Lyon is the third largest city in France (491,000 inhabitants, 2 million in the Lyon urban area), and is 
highly diverse in terms of socio-economic statuses and ethnic backgrounds. In the area of education, 
national educational policies being implemented locally in Lyon consist of a mix of specific and more 
generic policies. Specific programs target newcomer non-francophone students and parents who are 
not familiar with the French language and the French school system. Beyond these schemes targeting 
newcomers, there are no specific strategies about ethnic discrimination. When cases of discriminations 
are mentioned, they concern discrimination in society at large or, when in schools, between pupils and 
students (harassment, homophobia, intercultural conflicts, religious radicalization). However, the City 
of Lyon has started an action program focusing on the fight against discrimination, also within the 
education sector. The program has mainly consisted of projects set up by the municipality of Lyon, 
aimed at raising awareness among education professionals and students regarding forms of 
discrimination, including ethnic discrimination. 
In the area of social cohesion, immigrants and their descendants are not targeted as such. 
Policies are rather generic, and do not identify recipients by using ethnic labels, nor do area-based 
policies target disadvantaged neighbourhoods where ethnic minorities are deemed to be concentrated. 
However, a few specific actions have been implemented for a decade by Lyon City, particularly in the 
frame of the Equality task force, a city department that focuses on equality policies and develops more 
specific approaches to particular forms of discrimination, including those related to origin. Regarding 
governance, the issue of ethnic discrimination is mainstreamed at the horizontal level through the 
cooperation between different actors: The Grand Lyon, representatives of the central state, mayors of 
the different cities and of other decentralized authorities and non-state actors (private companies, 
NGOs, etc.). 
Saint-Denis is one of the largest cities in the Paris region (108 000 inhabitants in 2012). It has a 
high proportion of working-class inhabitants, including a high number of immigrants (36% of the city 
population, 39,300 people) (INSEE, 2011). Descendants of immigrants represent a major part of the 
city’s population (about two-thirds of the youth according to estimations, Tribalat, 2009). As in Lyon, 
policy actions in the field of education in Saint-Denis are quasi-exclusively based on the identification 
of school needs, without specific consideration of students’ ethnic and immigrant backgrounds. The 
only specific programs related to integration in Saint-Denis concern newly-arrived pupils and immigrant 
parents with language needs. Other policy actions that are related to integration concern educational 
activities on the history and memory of immigration. In terms of governance, the central State remains 
the main organizer, although the City is involved in anti-discrimination and memory- related activities. 
 
In the area of social cohesion, a mainstreaming approach to immigrant integration issues can be 
identified in the following ways: 
- Integration issues are considered to be addressed by mainstream institutions or by the 
immigrant reception schemes of Saint-Denis City. The main rationale for this mainstreaming 
approach is the high proportion of immigrants and ethnic minorities within the population (a 
super diversity argument). 
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- Anti-discrimination policies address all types of discrimination. At last, integration issues are 
being mainstreamed in policies directed at disadvantaged areas; affirmative actions address 
the whole population of these areas. Nevertheless, in addition to these generic policies, specific 
schemes for newly arrived immigrants are being implemented by both state actors locally, as 
well as by City actors (Citizenship task force). In terms of policy governance, policies directed at 
disadvantaged areas are also allegedly mainstreamed by involving a large range of public and 




The French government adheres to a monist perspective on society, which fits with the assimilationist 
approach to integration policies. During the past decade, there has been little perceivable change. 
Overall, there is no real shift away from the monist perspective. This monist perspective is evident in 
the French ‘civic’ framing of integration; emphasizing immigrants’ individual desire to participate in 
French society, or when it is defined as a problem, doubting immigrants’ willingness to acculturate and 
participate in French society. Education is a key-policy field in the monist-pluralist nexus. In the same 
period, monist measures and pluralist measures have been implemented. On the one hand, awareness 
and recognition of heritage and memories related to immigrants and minorities was promoted through 
several measures. On the other hand, schools were given the official mission to foster the acquisition 
of republican values and the learning of the national anthem in primary schools was made mandatory. 
In general, Lyon and Saint-Denis adhere to the national monist perspective on society. The communist 
municipal authority in Saint-Denis is more likely to frame issues in social-class- terminology than to 
develop an approach based on ethnicity. 
 
General/Specific 
Mainstreaming immigrant integration is not a new concept for France. Specific policies that do exist 
predominantly target newly arrivals during their first five years in France (since 2008/2009). Both in 
education and social cohesion, these measures are often aimed at a quick mastering of the French 
language, and secondly republican values. Other specific schemes are always implemented ‘behind the 
scenes’ and if not, they are often controversial6. 
Many French policies are centred on priority neighbourhoods, for example in education these 
areas receive more staff and funding, and Politique de la ville forms an important part of the strategy 
regarding social cohesion. Affirmative actions are used in some instances, for example in Lyon with 
regard to the school-to-work transition. Nevertheless, both municipalities agree that area-based 
policies are preferred7. A second mainstreaming approach can be recognized in anti-discrimination 
policies aimed at increasing overall equality instead of just integration. In some cases, such as in Saint- 
Denis, this may lead to other priorities, such as gender discrimination or class inequalities instead of 
ethnic discrimination. However, anti-discrimination policies in Lyon have led to ethnic discrimination 
being explicitly addressed. The difficulty is to sufficiently distinguish between anti-discrimination and 
                                                          
6
 Such as in the case of ELCO, education in immigrants’ mother tongue: given outside regular school hours by teachers 
appointed by their ‘home country’ and co-financed by the Ministry and the home country. The controversies are focused on 
the provision of ‘separate’ education and encouraging Islamic values. 
7
 These policies will be more efficient, are more universal, decrease the risk of stigmatization, carry greater legitimacy (as an 
established policy method) and will trigger less doubts and criticism about the skills of the beneficiary groups. 
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integration policies on the one hand and priority-neighbourhood policies on the other hand; the line 
between these policy-fields is often blurred. 
 
State-centric/Poly-centric 
The connection between mainstreaming and a poly-centric mode of governance is best recognisable in 
education: organizing educational priority areas involves a great range of public actors at all levels and 
in different sectors, as well as non-state actors, while specific (recipient) policies are often seen as 
stand-alone policies ordered by the national (governmental) actors and implemented by a specific 
school without much coordination. In general, integration-related policies are mainly issued by the 
French national government. However, some elements of deconcentration and decentralisation can be 
distinguished. At the national level, the dispersed responsibilities are scattered amongst multiple policy 
domains. An inter-ministerial committee for integration was created in 1990 to reinforce coordination8, 
but did not entirely succeed. Acsé (the national agency for social cohesion and equal opportunities) 
and its predecessors aimed at financing national and local NGOs in several policy fields and thereby 
increased the deconcentration of governance. PRIPI and PDI are examples of regional and   local optional 
programmes aimed at adaptation to local needs and contexts of the nationally set framework and 
objectives. Cities are also allowed to set up their own additional policies. However, municipalities have 
very limited possibilities to influence how integration and diversity issues are handled in schools and in 
general these initiatives are confined within the general frame of the French assimilationist/republican 
model. Therefore we can conclude that in case of generic policies, some forms of poly-centric 
governance can be distinguished, but the state-centric model is still dominant due to the importance 
of the national government in issuing social and educational policies. 
 
Conclusion 
The French Republican framing has heavily influenced their monist perspective on society. Following 
the egalitarian perspective based on colour-blindness, the assimilationist approach to immigrant 
integration has been prevalent throughout the past decades. Mainstreaming is therefore not 
recognisable as a new trend. It is implemented primarily by area-based policies (such as priority 
neighbourhoods  and  politique  de  la ville’s)  and via  anti-discrimination  policies,  focussing on all 
different kinds of discrimination. However, instances of ethnic discrimination are not always 
acknowledged or identified since the French national system does not collect systematic statistics on 
this topic. In addition, the governance of immigrant integration in France can be identified as being 
more state-centric than poly-centric, whereby deconcentration is more institutionalized than 
decentralisation. 
2.6      Spain 
 
In comparison to other Northern countries, Spain can be defined as a ‘new international immigration 
country’. Before the year 2000, Spain had for decades been a source of migrants both to North- 
Western Europe and Latin America. This clearly changed in the year 2000. From then on, Spain became 
one of the main European destinations for immigrants due to the needs of Spanish local markets 
regarding the expansion of the housing bubble. As a result the share of foreigners among the Spanish 
                                                          
8
 It only met three times: starting in the early 1990s, once in 2003 and once in 2006. 
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population increased from 2% at the end of the 1990s to more than 12% in 2011 (the peak of the 
immigration process). The massive influx of immigrants has strongly affected the make-up of its active 
population and population age structures. The immigrants present in the country come from three 
main regions. The first two (South America and Morocco) are traditional regions of origin of immigrants 
in Spain. The third, very recent region of origin is Eastern Europe, especially Romania and Bulgaria. 
However, the length of the economic crisis has led to the emigration of many of the immigrants who 
arrived during the previous decade. As a result, the share of foreigners has fallen to 10.7% in 2014. 
Nevertheless, the massive migratory flows have given rise in Spain to real political, economic and 
social concerns regarding the ability of society to successfully incorporate all of the newcomers. 
Given this very recent and intense migration process, Spain provides a relevant testing ground 
for the explanatory frameworks used in mainstreaming. In Spain the local and regional context are 
particularly relevant in the development of immigrant integration policies. Rather than being centrally 
coordinated, policies have developed from the local level and are subsequently brought together at the 
national level. Mainstreaming in this context is mainly a local and internal affair, as mainstreaming is not 
explicitly spoken of, though certain trends of mainstreaming can be recognized. 
 
Madrid and Barcelona 
Madrid experienced a dramatic change in the first decade of the 21st century. From being one of the 
greatest European cities with the highest rates of economic and population growth, it has suffered 
from one of the highest percentages of unemployment (21.5% according to Census 2011) because of 
the crisis, from 2008. Overall, the urban region of Madrid has grown considerably. This rapid growth is 
the result of a migration process including people who gained Spanish nationality. Thus, although in 
2014 foreign nationals represented 13.2% of the population in real terms, the total of immigrants 
including those naturalized exceeded 19.6%. This entire population (62.3% of which was born in 
America) has played a decisive role in the growth of the population of the entire region and in the 
change of its social structure. 
Throughout these years, the major changes in Madrid's population influenced the increase in 
social inequality. The importance of two specific categories must be highlighted in this regard. On the 
one hand, we have the expansion of the group consisting of professionals. On the other hand, we have 
the increasing, ongoing high numbers of foreign workers over the period in question who are often 
either unemployed or employed within the category of service and sales workers. 
Barcelona has a long tradition of immigration reception. During the 20th century many rural 
workers came to this city from other Spanish regions. However, since the beginning of the 21st century, 
population growth in Barcelona has  been entirely due  to  the  arrival of immigrants  from other 
countries. In 2014, 21.7% of the total population was represented by people born abroad (mainly from 
South America but there was also a remarkable percentage of people from Europe and Asia), although 
some of them have obtained Spanish nationality (4.7% of the total population). The percentage of the 
foreign population is higher than in Madrid because the latter includes within its territory some 
peripheral  neighbourhoods  of  the  kind  where  immigrants  do  not  usually  settle.  In the case  of 
Barcelona, these kinds of territories correspond to different municipalities for geographical reasons. The 
impact of the economic crisis has produced a high rate of unemployment (21.7% according to Census 
2011) within the working population of Barcelona. This situation is especially harmful to the immigrants 
as most of them belong to the most vulnerable social groups within Barcelona. 
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Monist/Pluralist 
In  comparison  to  other  European  countries  attitudes  towards  migrants  are rather  positive  and 
immigrant integration has been a little contested topic so far. On the whole there is relatively high 
diversity awareness, although more assimilationist policies and orientations can be seen in educational 
and urban planning.  Despite the positive attitudes towards immigrant integration, it is possible to 
identify a twofold approach to integration policies. At the national level the predominant approach to 
integration is ‘assimilation’, since a monistic perspective on society can be observed in education and 
urban planning among newly arrivals. However, at the local level there is a prevalence of pluralist 
policies. Examples of pluralist policies include mediation programs facilitating diversity in Madrid and 
intercultural diversity programs in Barcelona. Both examples are inclusively targeted at the entire 
population. 
Monist and pluralist policies typically coexist. However, as immigration is becoming a more 
stable phenomenon in Spanish society, pluralism seems to be becoming an increasingly important 
factor within generic policy fields such as education. In general interculturalisation is being adopted 
as a major concept in local policymaking, with generic policies such as 'Intercultural City Barcelona' 
targeting the diversity of the population. As mentioned above, the particular pluralist context of 
Barcelona as part of the Catalonian region should be taken into account here. 
 
General/Specific 
The first specific integration policies were implemented by local governments in the 1990s, after being 
initiated by local governments, social organizations and the regional government. Since then local and 
regional governments have adopted plans to improve coordination between the localized integration 
policies. The policies are both generic and specific in character. In general though, specific immigrant 
integration policies only make up a small proportion of all policies, and therefore most policies affecting 
immigrants, such as the inclusion of immigrants in additional educational policies, are generic. The 
attention for migrants depends largely on the generic frames of health and education policies, and 
migration departments are considered as being complementary to this. 
With the current disappearance of specific programs the trend towards generic policies is 
being reinforced. While generic and specific policies were previously rather separated, with specific 
policies exclusively focusing on diversity and migration through e.g. language policies, this 
differentiation is vanishing with the trend towards generic and more inclusive policies, as diversity 
becomes a generic concern of the whole society. Another factor to explain the development of generic 
programmes is the economic crisis, with budget cuts affecting specific programs aimed at migrants. In 
other cases, political factors and the ‘fear to put migrants into a privileged position’ in the eyes of non-
migrants, is putting pressure on decision makers, who want to abandon specific measures in order to 
avoid antagonising social opinion. 
 
State-Centric/Poly-Centric 
In line with the Spanish decentralized political system, immigrant integration policies have always 
developed strongly from the local level, followed by the national coordination of these policies, as can 
be observed in the National Integration Plan adopted by central government in 1994 and the 2007 
Plan for Citizenship and Integration (PECI). These policy measures generally also involve several non- 
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state actors. Locally, integration policies develop in collaboration between the local and regional 
government and social organisations in the area. Non-state actors are also closely involved in the 
national regulation of policies, such as the Forum for the Social Integration of Immigrants, a tripartite 
consultative body of NGOs, immigrant associations and regional, municipal and national governments. 
These relations are being contested due to the financial crisis and the subsequent budget cuts 
in the field of social policies, such as the axing of the Fund for the Integration of Immigrants, which 
was set up to distribute funds between the central, regional and local level of governance, disturbing 
the vertical collaboration between these levels. Several NGOs and social partners have also 
disappeared due to budget cuts and shrinking resources. Taken together with changes in central 
legislation concerning social services, the national and regional levels of governance seem to have 




In comparison to older immigrant countries, Spain has relatively low levels of diversity. In contrast to 
other countries, the immigrant population consists mainly of first generation immigrants, but this 
group is growing and becoming increasingly diverse in terms of countries of origin and other 
characteristics. These relative levels of diversity seem to work in favour of mainstreaming. 
In comparison to other European countries attitudes towards migrants are rather positive and 
immigrant integration has so far been a little contested topic. While specific and generic policies 
previously coexisted alongside each other, the economic recession is reducing specific policies and 
organizations working on immigrant integration due to decreasing funds. At the same time, generic 
policies are being explicitly phrased in more inclusive terms. This resonates with the plural character 
of certain Spanish regions, such as the Catalonian region, even prior to international migration. Finally, 
the trend towards generic and inclusive policies seems to be going hand-in-hand with the centralization 
of the governance of these policies while the role of NGOs is being challenged, in contrast to the strong 
Spanish local tradition of immigrant integration policies. 
 
2.7      Conclusions 
 
This chapter provided an overview of findings from the EU and country case studies. This involves in 
particular findings concerning the different forms of mainstreaming that are found in these cases, 
which provides the basis for the comparative analysis in the subsequent chapter. Table 2 provides a 
brief summary of main findings per case. 
What this chapter has made clear in particular is that mainstreaming should not be considered 
as a clear and uniform trend across the cases. Instead, there is significant variation between the 
countries, both in terms of the current state of mainstreaming, as well as current policy trends. In 
particular, differences remain significant in terms of whether integration governance, even if being 
mainstreamed, is oriented at monism or pluralism. Whereas in countries like Spain and the UK, as well 
as on the EU level, mainstreaming stands for an approach that seeks to recognize diversity, in many 
of the other cases mainstreaming does not have a clear orientation towards diversity. In some cases, 
mainstreaming stands for retrenchment, or for an approach that attributes responsibility primarily to 
the individual migrant. 
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In contrast, there is more commonality between the cases in terms of the trend toward 
generic rather than target group specific policies, as well as the trend toward poly-centric governance. 
Although this is happening to different degrees in different countries, most countries have been 
exchanging specific policies for specific migrant groups for a more generic approach. Also, in most 
countries we see a trend away from state-centric governance modes, toward deconcentration and 
decentralisation in particular. In the next chapter, we will attempt to explain these findings in more 
detail. 
 
Table 2: Summary of findings per case 
 
 Dimensions of mainstreaming 
 Monism/pluralism Specific/generic Poly-centric? 
France Monist orientation, but 
more pluralism at local 
level 
Generic policies (area- 
based) and specific 
policies targeted at 
newcomers 
State-centric, but slight 
trend toward localization; 
no deconcentration 
UK Pluralist at the local level, 
mixture of pluralism and 
monism at the national 
level 
Mainly generic (area- 
based) policies, some 
specific measures 
Poly-centric 




Monist orientation, local 
level slightly more 
pluralist oriented 
(strong move to) Generic 
policies (area- as well as 
needs-based) 
Poly-centric 
(deconcentration as well as 
decentralisation), 
retrenchment of national 
government 
Poland Monist orientation, some 
pluralism in large cities 
Generic (‘accidental), and 
Specific policies where 
needed 
Poly centric 
(deconcentration as well as 
decentralisation), strong 
role of NGO’s 
Spain Monist as well as pluralist 
elements 
Mixture of generic and 
specific policies 
Poly centric 
(deconcentration as well as 
decentralisation) 
EU Recognizing diversity 
(traces of 
interculturalism) 
Generic as well as specific 
elements 
Poly-centric per definition 
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3. Politics of mainstreaming 
 
 
This chapter provides a comparative analysis of the country and EU findings as presented in chapter 
2. The comparison is structured along the three basic questions of this report; what is mainstreamed? 
And how and why is this being done? This comparison is structured along the conceptual and 
theoretical framework outlined in chapter one (and in the conceptual report on mainstreaming by Van 
Breugel, Maan & Scholten 2014). The question of what mainstreaming is, will relate the cases to the 
typology of integration governance that we have developed to situate mainstreaming as a policy 
strategy. For the question of how mainstreaming takes place, we will compare the actors, frames, 
decision moments and focus events that may have played a role in the process of mainstreaming in 
the different cases. Finally, to answer why mainstreaming takes place, we will assess a number of 
variables regarding problem setting, policy context and political context that may explain why 
mainstreaming has or has not taken place in specific settings (or for instance, why it has taken place 
in specific ways). 
3.1      What is mainstreaming? Comparing types of mainstreaming 
 
The UPSTREAM project has developed a typology of mainstreaming (Van Breugel, Maan & Scholten 
2014) which distinguishes between three elements of mainstreaming: the cultural perspective on 
society (monist, pluralist), the targeting of policies (group-specific or generic) and the governance 
structure (state-centric or policy-centric).   How do the different cases examined in this project 
compare in terms of these three elements? And what patterns can be identified in this respect; is there 
a single trend in terms of mainstreaming in all the cases, or are there multiple interpretations of 
mainstreaming and different strategies of how to implement mainstreaming? And how does the EU 
case relate to the country and city cases in this respect? 
3.1.1    Cultural perspectives; mainstreaming lacks an explicit diversity orientation  
Especially in interculturalist literature an association is made between mainstreaming and a pluralist 
view on society, entailing a whole-society approach that embraces diversity. Based on this literature, 
one would expect mainstreaming to take place primarily in countries with a pluralist orientation. Our 
findings do not support this expectation, as mainstreaming appears in many cases to be associated 
with a more monist perspective. In various cases, mainstreaming did not so much involve a whole 
society approach oriented at acceptance of diversity and plurality, but rather an approach driven by 
the desire to stress the need for cohesion within a whole society perspective.  
In  fact,  in  some  cases,  such  as  Poland,  the  Netherlands  and  France  in  particular, 
mainstreaming was associated with  a denial of  society’s plurality. In spite of  bearing the clear 
characteristics of a super-diverse society, French society is framed as monist because the Republican 
principle  of equality  prohibits  any type of  distinction between French citizens  –  recognising all 
immigrants primarily and solely as French citizens9. Mainstreaming is driven by this concern for unity 
rather than acceptance of plurality. The Polish cultural perspective is shaped by its history of 
Communism, portraying an image of a homogenous nation. While Poland has opened up to significant 
                                                          
9
 Only distinguishing newly arrived immigrants during the first 5 years of settlement in France. 
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immigration since then, there still is little recognition of diversity, particularly at the national level. In 
the Netherlands, the clear policy trend of mainstreaming has been driven by an urge to abandon 
attention to specific groups rather than embracing diversity of society at large; rather, mainstreaming 
provides a policy strategy for ignoring diversity and retrenching from migrant integration policies. 
Only in the UK and to some extent Spain, do we find the correlation between mainstreaming 
and a whole society approach embracing diversity that we expected based on interculturalist studies. 
The UK explicitly reframed its diversity policies around the concept of super-diversity in response to 
the 2005 London bombings. While the previous multicultural frame in the UK had developed primarily 
at the local level, the redefinition of its policies in terms of super-diversity was very explicitly initiated 
from the national level. However, important in this context is that policies oriented at super-diversity 
in the UK are framed primarily as local rather than national policies. Also in the Spanish case, elements 
of pluralism and monism appear to be combined, fed by a general positive attitude towards diversity 
in Spain. In Spain too, however, explicit attention to diversity seems to be waning, especially due to the 
economic crisis. 
Whereas an association between mainstreaming and plurality seems rather absent at the 
national level, except perhaps in the UK, this association appears much more evident at the local level. 
At least, at the level of larger cities of migration that have been examined in this project. For instance, 
while the French and Polish monist frame of society are applied rather consistently at the local level 
the cases of Warsaw and Lyon do show slightly diverging patterns here, with attention for ethnic 
discrimination (Lyon) and attempts to propagate the city’s diversity (‘Diverse Warsaw’). Also in the 
Netherlands, citizenship programs at the local level seem more oriented towards a plural 
understanding of society as a whole (for instance ‘We are all Amsterdammers’). In Spain, both Madrid 
and Barcelona as diverse cities take active interculturalist approaches. It is at the city level that 
sensitivity for the (slightly more) diverse composition comes to light, showing traces of a pluralist 
stance on society. 
A pluralist orientation is clearly evident in the EU approach to mainstreaming. This is evident 
in the clear framing of integration as a two-way process and also in the very concrete emphasis on 
diversity and enhancing cultural understanding as part of educational programs supported by the EU. 
 
3.1.2    Policy targeting; mainstreaming as a strong trend toward generic policies 
Whereas mainstreaming does not appear to involve a clear trend toward a whole society approach 
that accepts diversity, we do find much more evidence for a trend toward generic policies. Of course, 
in some countries, most particularly in France, a generic rather than a group-specific approach to 
integration has been in place for decades. Also in new immigration countries like Poland and Spain, 
there is no clear precedent in terms of specific group policies. However, , a trend toward more generic 
policies could also clearly be identified in countries that had been renowned for their group specific 
policies in the past, the UK and the Netherlands. However, we also find that in many cases such generic 
policies involve explicit proxy strategies, making sure that specific groups are still targeted but without 
framing this explicitly. 
France  is  most  known  for  its  traditional  generic  (Republicanist)  frame  of  integration, 
prohibiting any type of distinction between French citizens according to race, origins or religion in 
favour of colour-blind policies. Apart from policies related to newly arriving immigrants, no policies are 
specifically related to immigration or integration. Instead policies are framed in generic terms, such as 
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the priority neighbourhood programs (Politique de Ville) and anti-discrimination programs strongly 
based on the equality framework. Specific measures are considered controversial, and if applied at all 
they tend to take place behind the scenes. The national Republican frame also strongly informs  policies  
at  the  local  level,  though  these  place  their  own  emphasis  within  the  equality framework. Lyon 
tends to be more involved with issues of ethnic discrimination and some traces of affirmative action 
are recognisable in its education policies. 
While  based  in  a very  different  tradition, Polish immigrant  integration policies  are  also 
primarily formulated in generic terms. This, however, is often not so much a conscious choice but 
should rather be understood as 'accidental mainstreaming'. Due to the low priority of diversity and 
integration issues these are not addressed specifically but rather collectively addressed in social 
cohesion or education policies, if they are addressed at all. However, this rather points at the lack of 
a tradition of integration policies than a conscious choice in how to address these issues by the national 
government. After all, when necessary, there seems to be little resistance to specific policies. A slightly 
more mixed picture is drawn at the local level, with more attention for diversity and a mix of specific 
and generic policies. In the field of education, both locally as well as nationally, specific language 
programs for traditional minority-languages are offered. 
While France and Poland are typified by their (non-)history of generic policies, the United 
Kingdom and the Netherlands have only recently moved in this direction, each departing from their 
own tradition of multicultural policies. In the United Kingdom the social inclusion frame was replaced 
by the social mobility strategy in 2012. Specific policies targeted at, inter alia, migrants have been 
replaced by a more individual approach aimed at social mobility. In the field of social cohesion this 
translates into area-based proxy strategies such as the community cohesion framework. In the field 
of education the move to generic policies mainly entails a move away from specific policies, moving 
away from special language programs (EAL) and replacing the Ethnic Minority Achievement grant with 
the more needs-based generic 'Dedicated School Grant'. In the Netherlands we see a similar pattern. 
Initially driven by increasing diversity, accelerated under strong political pressure, immigrant 
integration policies have moved away from the former multicultural emancipatory specific policies 
towards a more generic frame, with a stronger emphasis on the individual’s responsibility to integrate. 
In both countries education policies are being replaced in line with needs-based terms, focusing on 
deprived or disadvantaged students in general, while social cohesion policies tend to refocus from 
specific groups to disadvantaged areas, targeting vulnerable neighbourhoods instead. 
The generic framing of policies regarding migrant integration at EU level has a very specific 
background. The EU hardly has any direct competencies in the area of migrant integration (apart from 
a number of important spin-offs from EU migration and anti-discrimination policies). As Petrovic and 
Collett (2014) mention, this has been an important factor behind the mainstreaming of EU policies in 
this domain; as far as migrant integration is addressed at all, it is through generic measures in fields 
such as education and social inclusion rather than direct and specific measures. The politicization of 
migrant integration at the national level has only spurred this development further, with governments 
like the Netherlands playing an important role in making sure that in as far as EU policies are 
formulated in this area, this is done so in a mainstreamed way. Although in the 2000s integration had 
clearly been put on the EU agenda, recent developments suggest that integration has faded off the 
EU agenda, also in response to pressure from EU member states. 
In spite of the strong trend away from explicitly targeted policies to a more generic approach 
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to integration across all the cases studied, we also found clear ‘proxy strategies.’ This involves 
strategies where group definitions are replaced by area-based or needs-based definitions of policy 
targets. However, in practice, the policy often continues to address more or less the same groups. Take, 
for example, the Politique de Ville in France and the Priority zones in particular, which continue to 
address the very same neighbourhoods where immigrants are overrepresented, but only without 
framing the policies explicitly so. The same goes for the Dutch approach toward disadvantaged 
neighbourhoods and the financing structure for schools, and for the Spanish approach to old Integrated 
Renewal Areas (ARI). Also at the EU level, policies are formulated primarily in ‘colour-blind’ or generic 
terms, including policies aimed at specific groups (children, youth, elderly, gender) that may also 
indirectly address migrants, or policies aimed at specific barriers, needs or issues (such as early school 
leaving, poverty, low-income households, access to employment and services, access to higher 
education) that may be faced in particular by migrants. However, the question of whether this 
effectively ‘reaches’ migrants, or whether such measures imply that migrant integration is no longer 
a priority, is something that will be studied empirically in WP4 of the UPSTREAM project. 
3.1.3    Poly-centric Governance; a strong trend of decentralisation and deconcentration 
Thirdly, we also argued that besides its substantive meaning as a concept that refers to changes in 
policy content, mainstreaming also has a governance meaning referring to changes in how policies are 
organized. With reference to this governance dimension, we distinguish between decentralisation, or 
the shift of policy responsibilities between the national and the local level, and deconcentration, or the 
distribution of policy responsibilities between departments or (non)-governmental organizations. 
We found evidence in almost all cases of a trend toward more multi-level governance, 
involving in particular a more prominent role of the local level. In some countries, like Spain and the 
UK, the local level had already been prominent in the domain of integration. However, a similar trend 
toward localization can be found in traditionally more state-centric countries like the Netherlands, 
France and Poland. While in the Netherlands the move towards mainstreaming goes hand-in-hand with 
a decentralisation of policy responsibilities, in the UK the move towards the mainstreamed ‘Big Society’ 
approach was initiated specifically from the national level. In contradiction to the previous multicultural 
frame of the UK that was strongly developed at the local level, the current mainstreamed community 
cohesion frame is initiated from the Home Office at the national level. While there is still a strong 
emphasis on implementation at the local level, the frame is now more coherently utilized from the 
national level. However, as the launch of this Big Society philosophy has coincided with austerity 
measures, the plan is often perceived in terms of financial cuts rather than the community cohesion 
frame. While also taking place within a context of austerity measures, the Dutch development of 
mainstreaming is moving in the opposite direction in terms of state and poly-centric governance. While 
the Dutch multicultural model was strongly informed from the national level, policy responsibilities are 
currently being increasingly decentralized to the local level. When looking at the development of 
mainstreaming, cities such as Rotterdam and Amsterdam seem ahead of the national level in addressing 
their super-diverse population and developing generic frames of citizenship policies. Even in France, 
traditionally one of the strongest state-centric countries in Europe, it is evident that the focus of many 
integration measures are focused primarily at the local level, for instance in the ‘Politique de Ville’. Spain 
has a longer tradition of cooperation between national and local (and regional) governments. However, 
this has been challenged over the last decade by the economic crisis, leading to the demise of several 
national funding schemes. 
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In   most   cases,   except   perhaps   for   the   state-centric   French   case,   a   trend   toward 
deconcentration of policy amongst a larger group of governmental and non-governmental actors is 
also becoming manifest. In Poland non-governmental organizations play an important role in the 
formation and implementation of immigrant integration policies. These organizations focus on 
implementing recommendations from the EU level, in cooperation with the local level. Due to the 
relative absence of national immigrant integration policies in Poland, the influence of the EU is most 
clearly recognisable here in comparison to the other country cases. In France immigrant integration 
policies are implemented in a multiple-field setting, with governmental agencies like the (former) Acsé 
(National Agency for social cohesion and equal opportunities) playing an important role. 
However, deconcentration also brings challenges in terms of coordination. Policy developments 
in Rotterdam illustrate that a too narrow and strict move to generic policies risks diluting the issue of 
integration altogether, as this is not automatically picked up by other departments. Only after a report 
on local immigrant integration policies was the issue re-addressed and actively coordinated  between  
departments  and  actors.  While immigrant integration policies in  the Netherlands have been 
deconcentrated between departments since the early nineties, there are now plans to reduce the 
budget at national level to zero in 2015. Whether the remaining ‘knowledge structure’ will be adequate 
to guarantee that immigrant integration will be sufficiently addressed remains to be seen, and this so-
called risk of decoupling is typical of the development of deconcentration and mainstreaming across 
the researched cases. 
3.1.4    Conclusion 
 
When applying the three dimensions of mainstreaming (pluralism, generic targeting, and poly-centric 
governance) to a comparison between EU and country cases, we found some similarities in terms of 
what mainstreaming means in these cases. Particularly, we found a clear trend toward generic policies, 
away from group-specific policies as have been in place in countries like the UK and the Netherlands 
in the past. Interestingly, for the new immigration countries, like Poland and Spain, this means that 
the integration policies that are being developed immediately are being shaped as generic rather than 
specific policies. However, in spite of this clear trend, we also found that many generic policies involved 
proxy strategies: targeting policies on an area or needs-based orientation rather than a group 
orientation, but in practice still addressing more or less the same groups. In particular, the targeting 
of specific neighbourhoods is a clear example of this, and could be found across all cases. 
We also found that mainstreaming has a clear governance connotation, referring to a trend 
toward poly-centric governance. In most cases, even to some extent in France, we found 
decentralisation to local governments as well as deconcentration to various governmental and non- 
governmental actors. This means that integration governance has become a multi-level concern 
involving multiple actors within the governmental sphere and beyond, signalling the growing 
complexity of governance in this area and a retreat from the model whereby a single policy agency 
was responsible for all policy coordination. This governance mainstreaming also poses a challenge to 
integration governance, especially in terms of coordination across levels and between actors. There is 
a clear risk, as signalled in several cases, that levels are being ‘decoupled’ or that there is a lack of a 
coherent policy message being coordinated amongst different stakeholders. 
What we did  not  find was  an association between  mainstreaming and a whole society 
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approach for accepting diversity. At least, not for the national level. In fact, we found that in some 
countries, particularly in France and the Netherlands, mainstreaming was associated with a desire to 
stress cohesion rather than diversity, and to even ignore diversity to some extent. Only in the UK, was 
a relation found between mainstreaming and an emerging focus on super-diversity. However, this can 
also be seen as being due to the decentralisation of policies in the UK. In fact, we generally found that 
the relation between mainstreaming and a diversity orientation applied to cities across all of the 
various cases, including Lyon, Warsaw and Amsterdam. 
When making comparisons between the countries, it becomes clear that mainstreaming only 
involves a single trend in generic integration policies and poly-centric governance. It only appears to 
be associated with a diversity orientation at the local level. Remarkably, this applies across all the 
different cases examined, including the relatively new immigration countries (Spain, Poland) as well 
as the ‘old’ immigration countries (UK, France, the Netherlands). France stands out from the other 
cases in that having a generic approach is not so much something new, although the (somewhat more 
modest than in other countries) trend toward poly-centric governance is. The UK and the Netherlands 
stand out in that their break with the group-specific policies of the past is perhaps the most 
pronounced. The EU case stands out in that it not only supports poly-centric governance and generic 
policies, but also the more interculturalist diversity orientation that is also manifest at the local level. 
 
3.2      How? Comparing mainstreaming processes 
 
After having assessed what forms of mainstreaming can be identified in the different cases, this 
chapter focuses on how these forms of mainstreaming arose. More specifically, it identifies factors 
that contributed to or obstructed the mainstreaming of integration governance. In doing this, it will 
focus on four overarching factors that may have played a role in mainstreaming as a policy process: 
policy frames, (key) actors, main decision moments and focus events. The aim of this chapter is to 
assess if there are general patterns in terms of the (social/policy/political) process of mainstreaming. 
 
3.2.1    Framing; equality at the national level, super-diversity at the local level 
First of all, we will address the policy frames that are being mobilized in the various cases. Which 
frames are being used as rationales for mainstreaming or deciding not to mainstream in specific 
circumstances? Analysing such frames will provide a better understanding of the conditions under 
which mainstreaming may or may not be opportune. Note that this refers to frames that are used in 
actual policy discourses in the studied cases as rationales for mainstreaming, which is different from 
the more theoretical explanations for mainstreaming that we will develop later in 3.3. 
What stands out from our findings is that an equality and anti-discrimination frame is most 
conducive toward mainstreaming immigrant integration. This frame is prominent in France, but also 
increasingly  recognisable in  the  UK,  the  Netherlands  and  Poland.  Needs-based  or  area-based 
measures aimed at combatting socio-economic inequalities are considered the most appropriate 
policy tools within this context. The area-based neighbourhood measures are dominant in French 
policies regarding the Politique de la Ville and Priority Education Zones. However, area-based policies 
are increasingly recognisable in the UK (neighbourhood renewal policy frame) and the Netherlands 
(social cohesion policies in particular are becoming increasingly neighbourhood oriented, as illustrated, 
for example, by the krachtwijken approach in the Netherlands). In all of the countries, needs-based 
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policies are being installed that are often kept separate from integration policies (e.g. the social 
inclusion or social mobility agenda in the UK). Overall, the equality approach is considered less 
stigmatizing than specific schemes targeting immigrants. In France, these measures exemplify old policy 
tools that carry greater legitimacy than race-specific policies and the pursuit of equality is considered a 
universal policy (which consequently legitimizes it). The UK, the Netherlands and also Saint-Denis 
(France, city-level) believe that an equality approach rather than preconceived categories 
‘puts the money where the need is’ and, therefore, these methods are chosen from a pragmatic 
perspective. Likewise, The EU often implements an equality frame, only ‘recognizing’ vulnerable 
groups,  while  emphasizing  that  no  specific  policy  should  be  focused  on  them.  The  choice  for 
‘vulnerable’ avoids overt stigmatization and prioritization of particular groups, but subsequently runs 
the risk of carrying little effective weight. 
Thus, the equality framework appears to be a strong factor promoting mainstreaming in many 
countries. By focussing on areas or needs, immigrants may be implicitly (or explicitly) targeted, while 
not being an explicit target group. However, the striving for equal opportunities may lead to specific 
targeted policies as well. This is illustrated by the case of Amsterdam, which for a long time argued for 
the need for additional assistance for immigrants in order to achieve a truly equal position. 
Another  policy  frame  that  emerged  in  several  cases  involves  a  frame  that  emphasizes 
‘individual responsibility’ in the context of migrant integration. This frame can be both conducive and 
obstructive to mainstreaming. Framing language comprehension as a ‘duty’ (UK), obligatory civic 
integration courses (NL) or contracts stating the acceptance of the laws and values of the Republic and 
the intention to attend linguistic and civic courses (CAI, France) are examples of policy measures drawn 
up from the perspective that immigrant are themselves responsible for their integration. This frame is 
often used in the assimilationist notion of integration, which is especially recognisable in France, but 
also in the Netherlands and partially in the UK. In this context, migrants’ willingness and efforts are held 
to be central to their integration, and their adaptation to the host-society is perceived as a one-sided 
effort. This approach illustrates a monist perspective on society. Following this situation, policies can be 
formulated generically because the immigrants are responsible themselves for keeping up with the rest 
of the population. Consequently, policies are mainstreamed in only this perspective, but often lack the 
other characteristics of inclusiveness. Another approach to this frame is more individualistic, less 
focused on explicit migrants’ responsibilities and emphasizing everyone’s responsibility to be able to 
participate in society. This approach can be recognized in frames such as the UK’s ‘big society’ and the 
Dutch ‘participatory society’. 
Thirdly, the frame of super-diversity is often mentioned either explicitly or implicitly as a 
(discursive) explanation for why generic policies are needed. This means that targeted policies would 
have become increasingly impossible to implement due to the hyphenation of citizens and the large 
number of characteristics that have to be taken into account. This argument is echoed mostly in the 
Netherlands (for example when changing the education funding system) and the UK (the shift away 
from the race relations model). However, the super-diversity frame seems to be best applicable at the 
local level. Cities (or boroughs), such as Southwark (UK), Saint-Denis (FA), Rotterdam and Amsterdam 
(NL), increasingly emphasize that diversity is perceived as the norm, leading to a situation in which the 
distinction between immigrant and native citizen has lost its meaning. This situation leads to the feeling 
that the needs of immigrants are de-facto addressed by generic policies. However, unless the city 
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collects data on policy outcomes, it will remain unclear whether generic policies are also addressing 
the specific needs of immigrants. 
Finally, official integration policies are increasingly limited to immigrant reception policies. 
Following this limitation, socio-economic and socio-cultural integration are mainstreamed into other 
policy fields. This trend is recognisable in all countries, as well as at EU level. At EU level, border- 
management, asylum and the free movement of people has risen on the agenda, whereas immigrant 
integration has declined as a priority. In the UK, the approach to immigrant integration policies is 
twofold, aiming at equality policies for those within the countries, but increasingly enforcing strict 
borders. Also, many political debates are centred on the ‘influx’ of migrants into the country. Likewise, 
the Polish government focuses mostly on regulations concerning residence and work permits. Due to 
the low percentage of immigrants and narrow range of origins, a general lack of interest in immigrant 
integration is recognisable especially at the national level, to which immigrant entrance policies seem 
to be the only exception. Finally, in France and the Netherlands (especially during the assimilationist 
turn) immigrant reception, such as civic integration courses, is perceived as the main focus and 
eventually the exclusive dimension of official integration policies. This approach to integration policies 
does offer an opportunity to implement a mainstreaming approach to the socio-cultural and socio- 
economic integration of migrants. 
3.2.2    Actors: EU and national politics as driving actors behind mainstreaming 
Besides frames, we also examined what types of actors were involved in the process of mainstreaming, 
either encouraging mainstreaming or advocating alternative policy strategies. Is mainstreaming driven 
by political actors, or is it a development driven rather by other actors such as policy officials, NGOs 
and street level bureaucrats? Is mainstreaming driven by national actors, or has it been spurred rather 
by local actors or by developments at the EU level? 
Overall, we see that political actors were often strongly involved in advocating integration 
governance mainstreaming. In various cases, developments in the political setting were important 
incentives for mainstreaming. Elections may play an important role in this respect. Clear examples are 
the ‘re-foundation’ of French immigrant integration policies after the 2012/2013 elections or, at the 
local level, the presence or absence of Liveable Rotterdam in the coalition, which resulted in significant 
changes in policy frames and approaches to immigrant integration. In both the Netherlands and 
France,  politicization  of  migrant  integration seems  to  have  contributed  to  a  demand  for  more 
mainstreaming, either in the form of the French republican model or in Dutch retrenchment from 
integration policies. 
Furthermore, in several cases we found that research institutes or committees have also had 
an important role in the process, even though they do not always advocate mainstreaming per se. This 
applies in particular to the UK and the Netherlands. For example, in the UK, reports such as the Swann 
report and Parekh report led to more multiculturalist policies and the Cantle report introduced the 
community cohesion approach in the UK. In the Netherlands, Scheffer’s article entitled ‘The 
Multicultural Drama’ resulted in the multiculturalism backlash at the Dutch national level. On the other 
hand, many reports that focus on more explicit policies are influential as well, such as the Dutch WRR 
report regarding the re-framing of early leavers as ‘overloaded students’ rather than focussing on 
ethnic categories. However, reports may also lead to political controversies, as happened when a 
French advisory report suggested abolishing the ban on headscarves, when the Parekh report stated 
that “Britishness as much as Englishness has systematic, largely unspoken racial connotations” (Parekh, 
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2000, p.38) and when the  Rotterdam Bureau of Statistics  published a prognosis of future city- 
demographics that was interpreted by a politician of Liveable Rotterdam as a disturbing trend that 
should be interrupted by an ‘immigrant-stop’ (‘allochtonenstop’) or a ‘fence around Rotterdam’. 
However, although it seems that research institutes may sometimes be important actors in changing 
policies, acceptance of specific reports and the associated proposed policy measures is highly 
dependent on the match with the current policy frame. Reports which do not fit the political frame are 
more often disregarded, as is the case with the advisory reports on the re-foundation of integration 
policy in France. 
Finally, the EU Member state nexus is of particular interest when discussing actors involved in 
the mainstreaming of immigrant integration. New immigration countries, such as Poland, experience 
substantial influence by the EU on their integration policies. As our Polish case analysis shows, 
incentives provided in a European setting via funding schemes such as the European Integration Fund 
have been an important driving factor behind Polish policy initiatives. Sometimes even more than 
domestic problem awareness in Poland itself. Important in the context of this project, is that this 
external incentive structure provided by the EU also promotes mainstreaming as one of the EU’s 
common basic principles of integration. The influence of such EU schemes on developments in the 
‘old’ immigration countries like France, the UK and the Netherlands seems more limited. However, 
here too the EU has been an important engine of exchanging knowledge and best practices in terms 
of migrant integration at the city level in particular, amongst others in networks such as Eurocities and 
the European Migration Network. In return, member states try to influence EU policies regarding 
immigrant integration. This was made apparent, for example, in the role that the Dutch government 
played in the formulation of the Common Basic Principles, in which mainstreaming was explicitly 
framed as one of the principles. However, Denmark’s and Germany’s resistance to the inclusion of 
mainstreaming as one of the main principles was also successful. This example demonstrates that 
member states may be quite influential at the European level. The political climate in member states 
also influences the EU’s policy options. Increasing politicization and mediatization of the topic of 
immigrant integration in member states negatively influences the opportunities of the EU to address 
migrant-specific policies. The following paragraph (3.3 why?) will elaborate on the influence of national 
political climates on EU policies. 
3.2.3    Decision moments; mainstreaming in the context of austerity and ethnic data 
A third element that we looked at when reconstructing the process of mainstreaming integration 
governance, was whether there were key decision moments at which the choice whether or not to 
mainstream is taken. In particular, we looked at whether the decision to mainstream coincides with 
decisions taken in the context of the economic crisis that has haunted Europe since the late 2000s. Is 
there a relation between the decision to mainstream and austerity and retrenchment measures? 
Furthermore we looked at the availability of ethnic data and statistics, as one could imagine that the 
presence of such data would make group-specific issues more visible and consequently raise the 
urgency to have specific rather than mainstreamed policies. Does the availability or absence of ethnic 
data encourage or discourage mainstreaming? 
We indeed found a clear relation between mainstreaming and austerity measures at the 
national level in the ‘old immigration countries.’ In the UK and the Netherlands, austerity measures 
and governmental retrenchment have led to a more poly-centric mode of governance, in which the 
role of the central and local government is re-positioned from executive partner to ‘inspiring and 
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enabling’ director. This role re-positioning is part of broader frames, such as ‘big society’ in the UK and 
the ‘participatory society’ in the Netherlands, which pay increasing attention to the empowerment of 
the voluntary sector, civil society and individuals. In this context, the reduction of budgets for specific 
integration departments has often resulted in a decisive step towards mainstreaming, sometimes even 
long after these frames have changed in favour of generic policies. For example, budgetary cuts have 
proved to be decisive in the ending of cooperation with migrant organizations (Rotterdam) or think-
tanks (national level) in the Netherlands. In France, an ‘inter-ministerial delegate for integration and 
republican equality’ was installed as part of the ‘re-foundation’ of integration policies. This delegate 
will not be associated with a specific ministry and will not receive a dedicated budget in order to manage 
integration policies across all departments. In the context of austerity it was considered impossible to 
establish a specific integration institution with a dedicated budget. 
Overall, governmental retrenchment and austerity measures appear to be conducive to 
mainstreaming immigrant integration. This influence is especially apparent with regard to the move 
towards poly-centric governance and the ending of specific-focused institutions or subsidy-relations. 
However, in a context of austerity and retrenchment, the active coordination and inclusiveness of 
immigrant integration policies may be ‘lost’ in the process, which instead results in just ‘letting go’ of 
budgets and integration policies as a whole. A clear case of just ‘letting go’ can be seen in Rotterdam, 
where the responsible department only realized that the budget cuts had led to the abolishment of 
specific policies and departments, without a replacing coordination mechanism following the 
publication of the ‘state of integration’ report. For example, statistical data or monitoring of migrants’ 
achievements may be used as a coordination method. 
We did not find a relation between the availability or lack of ethnic data/statistics and the 
decision whether or not to mainstream. In the new immigration countries, hardly any ethnic statistics 
are available. Among the old immigration countries the Republican tradition in France has prevented 
the collection of ethic statistics. The idea here is that by collecting ethnic-specific data, governments 
run the risk of stigmatizing and, therefore, reinforcing the categories that policies are trying to 
overcome. On the contrary, the EU, particularly the EC and DG Education, regularly invests in and make 
use of research, updates and evaluations on the position of children with migrant backgrounds in order 
to monitor specific performance gaps between migrant and native youth. Equally, statistical 
monitoring, including ethnic-specific data, is well developed at each governmental level in the 
Netherlands, and to some extent in the UK. Monitoring is deemed essential in order to maintain a good 
overview of the integration process and effects of generic policies. However, a decline in publicized 
ethnic-specific data is recognisable at the national level and in Rotterdam, whereas it has actually 
increased in Amsterdam. This increase may be the result of the more inclusive approach to 
mainstreaming in Amsterdam. 
So, as mainstreaming has taken place both in cases with and without ethnic data and statistics, 
we cannot establish a meaningful relation between the availability of ethnic data and mainstreaming. 
However, collecting migrant-specific data could reinforce the inclusiveness of the mainstreaming- 
approach. In fact, this is something that will be examined in more detail in subsequent parts of this 
project; does the availability of ethnic statistics perhaps not influence the decision to mainstream, but 
influence its effectiveness by making explicit the effects that generic policies may have upon specific 
groups? 
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3.2.4    Focus events; impact on policy in general but on not mainstreaming per se 
Finally, we examined the role that specific incidents or ‘focus events’ may have played in the process 
of mainstreaming. We already know that migrant integration policy is typically a policy area where 
incidents such as terrorist attacks or urban riots have played an important role. However, have such 
events also spurred the process of mainstreaming per se? 
In  the  context  of  this  project,  we  found  several  key  focus  events  that  impacted  the 
development of migrant integration policy in general. However, we could not identify a clear relation 
between these events and mainstreaming in particular. The London bombings of 2005, the 2004 
bombings in Madrid and the murder of Theo van Gogh in Amsterdam in 2004 have been particularly 
important focus events in this sense. However, the differences in the political and policy responses to 
these incidents are especially noteworthy from a mainstreaming perspective. Whereas the bombings 
in the UK have had primarily national-level implications, the murder of Theo van Gogh proved to have 
particularly local implications. In addition, the UK response, as documented in the ‘Preventing Violent 
Extremism’ program, has resulted in an entanglement of cohesion with homeland security and 
counter-terrorism policies. Funds were allocated to local authorities with significant Muslim 
populations and counter-radicalisation among Muslim youths was stated as a concrete goal. These 
measures have led to the stigmatisation of certain groups and resulted in an atmosphere of distrust 
and disengagement. In contrast, the municipality of Amsterdam started a comprehensive program 
called ‘We Amsterdammers’, which aimed to counteract radicalization by opposing discrimination and 
exclusion; avoiding polarization and mobilizing positive powers. Subsequently, the program has 
resulted in an emphasis on social cohesion, city citizenship, commonality and identification through 
mostly generic policies. 
In the UK, local unrest such as the Milltown riots in northern English towns in 2001 also had a 
strong impact on integration policies in general, but not so much on mainstreaming in particular. 
These events did, however, trigger the policy change from multiculturalism to community cohesion. 
The framework of community cohesion focuses on promoting stronger bonds and shared values at the 
local level and operates through an area-based proxy for integration governance. Similarly in Bristol, a 
Race Equality and Community Cohesion Plan was developed in order to tackle tensions caused by rapid 
local population change, after disturbances occurred in the Barton Hill area in the summer of 2003. 
The Plan eventually led to a community cohesion strategy. Triggered by specific attention to problems 
of integration or social cohesion, this led to a package of initiatives largely targeting immigrants and 
minority communities. Eventually however, this perspective shifted to a focus on the wider 
community. 
However, similar urban unrest in France, the ‘banlieues riots’ in 2005 but to some extent also 
the more recent Charlie Hebdo affair, only further strengthened the French resolve to continue its 
mainstreamed ‘Republicanist’ approach. These incidents were, in the specific French political and 
societal context, rather interpreted as signs that the Republicanist approach needed to be 
implemented with more vigour. This seems to support the conclusion that focus events do indeed have 
a strong effect on integration governance, but that there seems to be no generalizable effect on 
whether or not mainstreaming is adopted. 
3.2.5    Conclusion 
In this section we have tried to develop a better understanding of mainstreaming as a policy process; 
under what conditions, and in what way, was the decision whether or not to mainstream taken in the 
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selected cases? In particular, we looked at whether specific frames are used to legitimize 
mainstreaming, whether specific actors have played a key role and whether there have been key 
decision moments for taking the step toward mainstreaming, and finally at the role of focus events. 
We found that the legitimation of mainstreaming is often framed in terms of equality and anti- 
discrimination. Having specific policies is taken as a signal of inequality and alleged to have potential 
discriminatory effects. In specific cases, this is combined with an individual responsibility frame, 
stressing that integration is primarily the responsibility of all (new) citizens themselves regardless of 
their ethnic, cultural or religious background. However, a different picture appears when looking at 
the rationale given at the local level for mainstreaming. Here, super-diversity as a frame emerges much 
more prominently than on the national level, stressing that mainstreaming is the most appropriate 
governance strategy given the essentially diverse nature of the city population. Interestingly, such local 
framing can be found in cities with very large migrant populations, such as London, Lyon and Barcelona, 
as well as in cities with relatively few migrants, such as Warsaw. 
Political  actors  and  politicians  play  an  important  role  in  the  decision  to  mainstream, 
particularly on the national level. This applies especially to the ‘old’ immigration countries where 
integration governance has been a particularly politicized policy area in the national arena. This applies 
less to the ‘new’ immigration countries and the EU. There we see that EU initiatives (such as funding 
schemes and networks) play an important role in promoting mainstreaming. EU initiatives such as the 
European Integration Fund have not only spurred policy developments in these new immigration 
countries, but have also provided incentives for city collaboration on a broader scale within Europe. As 
such, at the city level the EU has also been an important actor in promoting mainstreaming. 
Our project also shows that the decision to mainstream as taken in several of our cases cannot 
be separated from a broader context of austerity measures and retrenchment. This applies in particular 
to the ‘old’ immigration countries, where the relation between austerity measures and mainstreaming 
was a direct one, at least at the national level. We did not find any clear evidence that the presence or 
absence of ethnic statistics had any impact on the decision whether or not to mainstream; 
mainstreaming has taken place in countries with as well as without ethnic statistics. What remains to be 
seen, in subsequent parts of this project, is whether the availability of ethnic statistics helps monitor 
the effectiveness of generic policies in terms of impact on specific groups. 
Finally, we found that focus events and incidents such as terrorist attacks and urban unrest, 
as encountered  in particular in the  ‘old’ immigration  countries over the last  decade, were  not 
unequivocally conducive or non-conducive to mainstreaming. 
3.3      Why? Explaining mainstreaming 
 
After analysing the main patterns of what is mainstreamed and how, this section addresses the ‘why’ 
question. It aims to develop an explanation for why under specific circumstances, integration was or 
was not mainstreamed. Applying the multiple streams framework developed by Kingdon (2003), we 
will address a set of expectations on how developments in the problem, policy and political setting 
may trigger or prevent mainstreaming. These expectations were formulated by combining this 
framework with literature on super-diversity, integration policies and governance literature. 
First of all, in the problem context, we expect that a longer history of migration and a high 
degree of diversity will increase the chance of mainstreaming immigrant integration policies. On the 
other hand however, we expect this chance to decrease when perceived integration problems are 
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prominent. Secondly, with regard to the policy background of the cases, we expect that experience 
with mainstreaming in other policy domains (referring to cross-pollination between departments) and 
the increasing influence of the economic crisis will stimulate mainstreaming, while countries or 
departments experienced in the use of specific policies may be less likely to switch to mainstreaming. 
Finally,  with  regard  to  the  political  influence  on mainstreaming,  increasing  political  and  media 
attention and increasing populism around migration and integration debates make it more and more 
difficult to justify specific policies. Therefore, we expect these elements from the political context to 
be of influence on the decision to mainstream. Equally, individualization or in particular a diminishing 
tendency to organize in groups or communities, can be expected to lead to mainstreaming. We will 
describe our findings for each of these hypotheses below, and the main trends across the countries 
and for the European Union will be given conclusively. 
3.3.1    Problem setting; problem developments spur mainstreaming only at the local level 
The first stream to be discussed here is that of problem setting, explaining why issues are recognized 
as problems and how this leads to policy and political prioritization of mainstreaming in integration 
governance. The first aspect to be assessed concerns the expectation that a longer history of 
immigration, with different phases and groups of immigrants, increases the likelihood that integration 
policies will be mainstreamed. However, our findings show more variety in some aspects of the 
expected pattern. When it comes to mainstreaming as a trend from specific to generic policies, we can 
identify a pattern in our findings that matches this expectation. Distinguishing between France, the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom as old immigration countries, and Spain and Poland as new 
immigration countries, we can indeed observe that the old immigration countries are more inclined 
to adopt generic policies. France has a long history of generic integration policies. The Netherlands and 
the United Kingdom, on the other hand were both formerly known for their multicultural integration 
policies, and have since gone through different phases of integration policies. Mainstreaming is now 
considered the next, perhaps even inevitable, step. This is particularly recognisable at the local level, in 
Amsterdam, Rotterdam and the London borough of Southwark. This, however, translates mostly into 
a move to generic policies and does not necessarily entail the development of more inclusive 
policies. France also has a long history of immigration, but in contrast to the UK and the Netherlands, 
it has a tradition of generic integration policies, strongly informed by a Republican ideology which can 
be linked to mainstream targeting. While for France the history of generic integration policies means 
a continuation of this policy history, mainstreaming in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom can be 
understood as a move away from its previous specifically targeted policies. 
For the new immigration countries, there appears to be a slight tendency to adopt more 
specific policies when addressing immediate immigrant needs. This might be explained by the fact that 
integration needs are new and more prominent, although the ‘young’ political context proves to be 
influential here too, as will be elaborated in the sections below. The pattern between the history of 
migration and mainstreaming does not emerge when looking at the relation between migration history 
and the monist or pluralist orientation of policy, or state-centric or poly-centric modes of governance. 
When it comes to plural and poly-centric forms of mainstreaming we see diverging patterns 
amongst the ‘old’ immigration countries, whereby the UK can be considered more pluralist, particularly 
when compared to the Netherlands and France. While the long history of immigration seems to be of 
influence on mainstream targeting in the UK and the Netherlands, it cannot explain the monist or 
pluralist orientation of policy, or state-centric or poly-centric modes of governance for either the old 
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or the new countries of immigration. Furthermore, the trend toward poly-centric governance can be 
found in all countries, though to a lesser extent in France. Here too, no relation can be found between 
migration history and mainstreaming. 
A second expectation to be addressed concerns the relation between mainstreaming and the 
extent of  diversity,  in  terms  of  ethnicity  and religion  as  well  as  intergenerational  or  individual 
diversification within these elements (Vertovec, 2007; Faist, 2009). In this case France, the 
Netherlands, the UK and Spain can be considered as highly diverse societies, in contrast to Poland 
which is thus expected to be less likely to mainstream its integration policies. When looking at the first 
group of countries this thesis is most clearly illustrated at the local level. On the one hand the super- 
diversity of, for example, London or Amsterdam demographics leads to a trend of generic policies, as 
mainstreaming is considered ‘inevitable’ when diversity is literally considered a ‘mainstream’ topic. 
Despite their multicultural history of specifically targeted policies, the  increased  diversity of its 
population has led to a move away from targeted policies. The increasing diversity within groups has 
made targeted policies ‘impossible to implement’ as Dutch education policies illustrate. Although at 
the national level this move away from targeted policies in the Netherlands and the UK also seems to 
be driven by other policy and political influences. 
Additionally, the local level proves to be more sensitive to inclusive policies than the national 
level, addressing the diversity of its population even against national trends, as anti-discrimination or 
diversity initiatives in Lyon and Warsaw illustrate. Of all cases Poland is least diverse. This lack of 
diversity indeed seems to decrease the probability of mainstreaming. Even in Warsaw, which is slightly 
more diverse and attempts to address the issue by programs such as ‘Diverse Warsaw’ the emphasis 
on diversity seems to  encourage  a targeted  response  rather than a  process  of mainstreaming. 
Therefore, diversity can indeed be considered an important driver for mainstreaming: on the one hand 
moving away from specifically targeted policies, while at the other hand addressing diversity within 
generic policies. Although the local level shows a particularly strong trend in this respect, it cannot 
explain why this does not translate to more inclusive policies at the national level, particularly in France 
and the Netherlands. Poland’s short history of immigration seems to have a stronger explanatory value 
than Warsaw’s attempts to address diversity. 
Finally, we formulated an expectation regarding the extent to which integration problems are 
perceived, especially in relation to specific groups. We expect that when there is a strong perception 
of specific integration problems, this will decrease the probability of mainstreaming. Rather, we expect 
that when specific problems are perceived, this will trigger specific policy responses. Here we can 
distinguish roughly between the Netherlands and the United Kingdom as countries with a strong 
perception of specific problems of integration on the one hand, and France, Spain and Poland as its 
opposites. To a significant extent, this expectation does not fit our findings from these countries. The 
Netherlands and the UK seem to combine a relatively strong focus on specific integration problems 
with a shift towards generic policies and poly-centric governance. Since the Dutch backlash against 
multiculturalism in the early 2000s, migration-related issues in the Netherlands still tend to be framed 
in group-specific terms. The national integration debate in particular is characterized by strong 
problem framing, focussing particularly on issues of social-cultural integration and adaptation, and 
more generically on issues of social cohesion. However, generic policy solutions are being proposed, 
despite the specific problem framing typical of the so-called ‘dilemma of recognition’. In the UK, policy 
developments in the field of integration are partially incident driven, with perceived problems of 
integration coming to the fore through civil disturbance or incidents. In the UK perceived problems of 
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integration, targeted through a needs-based proxy, have eventually led to a generic frame of social 
cohesion intended to 'lift up the entire area', thus stimulating the process of mainstreaming. 
On the other hand, integration problems are framed less specifically in France, Spain and 
Poland. True to its Republican tradition, France does not register or monitor problems according to 
ethnicity or immigrant background, but rather considers all its citizens French alike. According to the 
hypothesis this would advance the chances for mainstreaming. While France is indeed known for its 
generic targeting, the lack of attention for specific problems of integration seems to obstruct a move 
to an inclusive, whole society approach to mainstreaming. In a later stage of mainstreaming, attention 
for specific problems can in fact lead to more inclusive mainstreaming,  and a readjustment of 
mainstream services to align with the diversity of its society. In Lyon, for example, problems around 
ethnic discrimination are addressed explicitly, in contrast to the French tradition at the national level. 
The attention for these perceived problems does not seem to work against the tradition of generic 
policies, but instead puts emphasis on the inclusiveness of these policies, as evident from advanced 
monitoring schemes at the level of (Grand) Lyon. Equally in Rotterdam the move towards generic 
citizenship policies was supplemented by additional programs on integration, after problems in this 
domain were addressed in a report on the status of integration in the cities of Rotterdam and 
Amsterdam, advocating a more inclusive frame of citizenship. In Spain and Poland perceived problems 
of integration are of little significance in the debate of integration and mainstreaming. 
 
3.3.2    Policy context; mainstreaming in the context of austerity and retrenchment  
Regarding the policy context, we have formulated three expectations on how policy developments 
may account for the presence or absence of mainstreaming in integration governance. We expect that 
mainstreaming will be promoted by the amount of experience with mainstreaming in other policy 
domains (referred to as spin-offs between departments) and the increasing influence of the crisis, 
austerity and governmental retrenchment across European countries. On the contrary, countries or 
departments that have a lot of experience with the use of specific policies may be less likely to switch 
to mainstreaming. 
First of all, regarding the potential path-dependency of specific (or generic) policies from the 
past, it is clear that the cases under research have different histories of specific or generic policies. The 
United Kingdom and the Netherlands in particular are characterized by their strong tradition of 
specifically targeted policies. The UK case illustrates that the path dependency of specifically targeted 
policies at the local level indeed seems to resist the national spread of mainstreaming, with a strong 
initial minority focus in generic community-cohesion programs. As explained above, this path- 
dependent specific trend was eventually overcome through the needs-based focus of the program. 
The Dutch case shows a similar pattern, although here eventually the legacy of specific policies and the 
perception that these policies would have had inadvertent negative effects in terms of labelling and 
reification of ethnic boundaries, contributed to the shift to generic policies rather than preventing it. 
Spain shows a combined pattern of specific and generic policies coexisting, though these do not seem 
of particular influence on the move to mainstreaming. 
The absence of a tradition of specific policies in France and Poland can be considered as 
control cases, and are thus expected to stimulate the move to mainstreaming. France has a strong 
tradition of generic policies, which shows a strong path dependency. However this generic tradition is 
based on the Republican tradition and leaves little room for a more culturally sensitive whole society 
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approach. The French city of Lyon, on the contrary, has more experience with specific policies, 
particularly in the field of ethnic discrimination, in contrast to the hypothesis, leading to more inclusive 
mainstreaming. In the case of Poland specific policies in the field of integration are relatively new. Its 
prior absence can be considered an example of 'accidental' mainstreaming, where generic policies are 
the result of a simple absence of policy priorities in the field of integration rather than a conscious 
choice of policy targeting. However this cannot explain the current divergence in specific and generic 
policy responses in the field of integration policies. On the one hand, the Polish policies tend to be 
formulated in a generic sense as there is little attention for specific groups or policy problems, on the 
other hand the de-politicized context of immigrant integration issues in Poland leaves room for both 
specific and inclusive targeting. So, while at first glance the path-dependency of specific policies seems 
to obstruct a move to generic policies, it is illustrated that they might as well move away from this, or 
that specific policies can actually lead to more inclusive forms of mainstreaming. The tradition of 
specific policies might delay the development of mainstreaming, but does not seem to be of decisive 
influence on any eventual shift towards or away from mainstreaming.  
Secondly, we  found a  clear  relation between mainstreaming and  austerity measures or 
government retrenchment. This clearly places the development of mainstreaming within the context 
of the recent financial and economic crisis in Europe. Particularly, retrenchment seems to reinforce 
already existing shifts towards generic policies. Several countries report that it is increasingly difficult 
to implement specific policies, due to the political and economic circumstances, which make it harder 
to defend specific policies for immigrants. In Spain, the economic crisis has had a highly significant 
impact on government efforts in the domain of migrant integration, contributing to retrenchment. In 
Poland, retrenchment measures seem to be having less influence on integration policies, but 
retrenchment seems to be stimulating or reinforcing the move toward generic policies. On the other 
hand, several experts are warning of the risk of decoupling and decreasing the effectiveness of policies 
when the process of mainstreaming is accelerated or driven by cost reduction. In Rotterdam 
retrenchment measures in 2010 had a decisive influence on the citizenship frame that had been set 
up in 2006 as an important step in the process of mainstreaming its diversity policies. But here too, 
the risk of decoupling became apparent after the stringent revision of the citizenship program funds 
risked doing away with diversity policies altogether, as diversity responsibilities were not taken up by 
other departments. Only when integration was put back on the agenda through an evaluation, was 
there more active coordination between departments. However it is exactly this attention for diversity 
and inter-departmental cooperation that is under threat with declining budgets.  
Finally, an important finding from this project is that, contrary to our expectations, we found no 
connection between mainstreaming in the field of immigrant integration policies and mainstreaming in 
other policy areas such as disability, gender and climate. This strongly suggests that this is not a case of 
spill-over or ‘policy transfer’ from one of these areas to integration governance, but that the 
mainstreaming of integration policies is driven by other influences. Consequently, we have to be very 
cautious when comparing integration mainstreaming to experiences from these other policy areas, as 
these are likely to be very different phenomena. 
 
3.3.3    Political stream; politicisation as a motor for mainstreaming at the national level 
Finally, concerning the political stream we expected that increasing political and media attention, as 
well as populism around migration and integration debates, would make it more difficult to justify 
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group-specific policies. Likewise we expected increasing individualization to be of influence on the 
political context of mainstreaming, as here too it will become increasingly difficult to endorse targeted 
integration policies. 
We indeed found a strong relation between increased political and media attention, populism 
and a shift to generic policies. The visibility and negative framing of immigrant integration makes it 
increasingly difficult to explicitly address integration issues or target specific migrant groups. These 
patterns can be observed in France, the Netherlands, the UK, and to a lesser extent in Poland and 
Spain. In France the politicization of immigrant integration reinforces the dilemma of recognition: 
when framing immigrant integration is increasingly problematized and framed in terms of individual 
responsibility to integrate, this does not lead to specific policies. 
Although increasing political and media attention and the (re-)framing of immigrant 
integration under pressure from the rise of populist parties seem to go hand-in-hand, they are having 
a very different effect on the degree to which policies are framed inclusively for all. When 
distinguishing between these two it becomes clear that while increased attention makes it more 
difficult to target specific groups or unpopular themes, on the other hand political and media attention 
on integration issues can put the issue back on the map, thereby advancing a more inclusive whole 
society approach.  In the UK,  for example,  political and media  pressure were  important  drivers 
accelerating the move from the integration to the community cohesion frame. In the Netherlands it 
was under political and populist pressure in the early 2000s that social cohesion as a generic challenge 
of integration was put on the map in the first place, leading to a move away from 'beneficial' specific 
policies. However if we look at policy developments since then, we see that it was under a subsequent 
decrease in political pressure that integration issues were once more addressed as political and media 
priorities locally, leading to the next steps in mainstreaming and embracing a whole society approach 
towards citizenship policies. Thus, while populism might stimulate a move away from specific policies, 
it also obstructs the next and essential step towards more inclusive generic policies. After sentiments 
have calmed down renewed attention for diversity and issues of immigrant integration can lead to a 
whole-society approach; if not addressed explicitly, policies run the risk of diluting the issue of 
integration altogether. 
The influence of the media and politics seems less pressing in Poland and Spain. In Poland 
immigration or integration policies have hardly led to any political debate, leaving room for either 
specifically targeted or inclusive generic policies. What triggers a specific or generic policy response, 
however, cannot be explained by the influence of political and media attention, leaving the Polish case 
ambiguous in this sense. The Spanish case seems to be in contrast to the expected trend. Decreasing 
attention for the topic by the current government, in combination with decreasing funds, are actually 
driving the Spanish integration debate towards the European discourse of a generic but less inclusive 
frame. 
The EU case shows that politicization on the national level speaks to mainstreaming at the EU 
level in a very specific way. First of all, political contestation on the national level seems to have made 
EU member states, such as the Netherlands and France in particular, very reticent when it comes to 
supporting the development of an EU approach to migrant integration. Furthermore, in as far as an EU 
approach could develop, this was framed in terms of mainstreamed policies, as a specific approach to 
migrant integration could not emerge at the EU level. However, as noted in the EU case study, there are 
few means to ensure that this mainstreaming strategy is effectively implemented across various 
directorate generals, such as DG Education, DG Home Affairs and Justice and DG Employment. This 
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carries the risk of diluting migrant integration policies, with mainstreaming being used as an excuse 
not to have policies on migrant integration. 
Lastly,  in  the  political  sphere  we  expected  individualization  to  increase  the  chances  of 
mainstreaming, as it will become harder to justify specific policies. Most countries are experiencing 
an increasing individualization regarding the terms and conditions for integration. This individualization 
can be connected to an assimilationist frame of integration with an emphasis on individual 
responsibility for integration and adaptation. While France has a long tradition of this individual, 
Republican, frame, this frame has developed relatively recently in the UK, the Netherlands and Spain. 
In France the individualized framing of responsibilities for integration leads to two patterns: a 
generic and monist perspective on integration with an emphasis on the individual’s willingness and 
efforts to integrate, and correspondingly the traditional ‘Republican’ value of equality that is applied 
to frame anti-discrimination issues. In the UK, increasing individualization is linked to the shift from 
social inclusion to social mobility, now one of the dominant frames in integration policies. In the 
Netherlands the individualized frame with a focus on individual responsibility for integration has 
likewise become very dominant in recent years, especially at the national level. At the local level a 
diverging trend of a more collective citizenship frame has unfolded. We can also observe this diverging 
trend in Spain, especially between the regional and local level in Madrid, where the former is engaging 
with a trend towards individualization. Apart from the French case, the frame of individualization 
seems to be mainly connected to a move towards generic targeting, while obstructing the 
development of more pluralist and inclusive policies due to the dominance of the individual frame over 
more collective frames of integration. For the Polish case individualization seems irrelevant to the 
development of mainstreaming. 
3.3.4    Conclusion 
When comparing the problem, policy and political context of mainstreaming, we can identify several 
circumstances that might stimulate or accelerate the process of mainstreaming. For example, 
demographic circumstances of high diversity or a long history of immigration and integration (policies) 
seem favourable to the development of mainstreaming, but cannot explain the choice for 
mainstreaming on their own. Likewise, the policy context of retrenchment can accelerate the process 
of mainstreaming but once more, this has little value in itself to explain why mainstreaming is applied 
in the first place. This primarily seems to depend on the political context of the situation. 
The degree of diversity might lead to an ‘inevitable’ step towards generic policies but cannot 
explain why this does not develop beyond the local level in most countries. The choice regarding how 
to deal with such circumstances seems to depend strongly on the political setting in a country. Political 
and media attention and populist pressure in the first instance both seem to press for a move towards 
generic policies since specific policies are hard to defend under these circumstances (perceived as 
unevenly beneficial). While problems of integration are framed specifically, policy solutions are framed 
generically (dilemma of recognition). However when populist pressure declines, political and media 
attention for perceived problems and needs of integration can lead to more inclusive forms of 
mainstreaming.  But  it  is  important  to  note  that  the  level  of  political  pressure  is  the  primary 
determining factor here, deciding the direction in which mainstreaming will develop.




This report provides an analysis of the rationale of mainstreaming in integration governance: what is 
mainstreamed to achieve migrant integration, how have mainstreamed integration policies been 
developed, and why did governments decide to mainstream? This analysis is based on the 
conceptualization of mainstreaming as developed in the first UPSTREAM report (Van Breugel, Maan & 
Scholten, 2014): a shift toward generic policies oriented at a pluralist society and involving poly-centric 
forms of governance. This report provides the basis for an in-depth analysis of the impact of 
mainstreaming in the subsequent work package. Concerning the politics of mainstreaming, it provides 
a comparative analysis of findings from the France, Poland, Spain, the Netherlands, the UK and the EU. 
 
Clear trend towards generic and poly-centric integration governance 
 
First of all, our analysis shows that what most cases have in common in terms of mainstreaming is a 
trend away from group specific-policies towards generic policies, and from state-centric to poly- centric 
modes of governance. In almost all cases, in as far as group-specific measures had been adopted in the 
past, there was a clear trend towards adopting generic policies, and embedding integration measures 
into generic policy areas such as housing and education. Whereas this may be nothing new for France 
with its Republicanist tradition, this is something new for countries like the Netherlands and the UK 
with a more multiculturalist policy history. However, we found that new immigration countries are 
slightly more inclined towards adopting specific measures wherever necessary. In the ‘old’ immigration 
countries, such as France, the Netherlands and the UK, this was only done for specific groups of 
newcomers. 
In terms of governance, we also observed a clear trend away from state-centric modes of 
governance to more poly-centric governance. This clearly involves an increase of complexity in the field 
of integration governance, involving a large set of governmental and non-governmental actors in the 
policy process, and attributing in particular a more prominent role to the local level. In the Netherlands, 
UK and Spain, the local level has clearly become more prominent in terms of integration governance, 
sometimes also leading to significant discrepancies in integration governance between cities within a 
specific country, as well as between the local and the national level within one country. The case of 
France stands out to some extent, as localization is taking place, while at the same time the state-
centric model is apparently being upheld. This ‘local turn’ in integration governance clearly underlines 
the need to look at mainstreaming at both the local and national level. Furthermore, in Poland, poly-
centric governance involved a growing role of NGOs in integration governance, at both the national 
and the local level. 
In terms of poly-centric governance, the EU seems to play a particular role. On the one hand, 
national political contestation of migrant integration has limited EU involvement in the field of migrant 
integration. This has allowed for a ‘mainstreamed’ approach to migrant integration at the EU level, 
such as formulated in the European Common Basic Principles of Integration and in the Common 
Integration Agenda. On the other hand, the EU has played an important role in the diffusion of the 
idea of mainstreaming, primarily via open methods of coordination. This applies in particular to 
relations with new member states, where very various schemes mainstreaming integration governance 
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was promoted, but also in relations with the local level such as city networks in particular. For the ‘old’ 
immigration countries’, this relation applies to a much lesser extent. 
 
Diversity orientation part of mainstreaming on the urban level but not the national level 
 
However, we also found significant variation in terms of different forms of mainstreaming. This shows 
that mainstreaming should not be seen as a monolithic process. This applies in particular to the cultural 
dimension of mainstreaming, or the whole society orientation embracing diversity. Diversity 
orientation appears to be particularly absent at the national level (except to some extent in the UK). 
In contrast to this, diversity orientation is part of mainstreaming efforts at the local level. This applies 
to cities in both the ‘new’ and ‘old’ immigration countries. Furthermore, this diversity orientation is 
also part of the EU mainstreaming approach, and in fact plays an important role in European city 
networks where knowledge and best practices in this regard are being exchanged. 
The lack of a diversity orientation in national integration mainstreaming marks an important 
difference with how mainstreaming is understood in other policy fields such as gender, disability and 
climate. Whereas in those areas mainstreaming involves the development of a generic sensitivity for 
gender, disability and climate, this seems less the case for integration mainstreaming, at least at the 
national level. At the local level, integration mainstreaming seems more similar to mainstreaming in 
those other areas. It is remarkable, however, that no clear references to mainstreaming in those areas 
were found in any of the cases we examined. 
 
Discrepancy between national and local mainstreaming 
 
The findings concerning ‘what’ is mainstreamed clearly relate to what we found on ‘how’ 
mainstreaming was adopted and ‘why’. The discrepancy between national and local interpretations 
of mainstreaming is also reflected in the frames that are used to legitimate mainstreaming. At the 
national level, mainstreaming is framed particularly in terms of promoting equality, anti- discrimination 
and individual responsibility. In contrast, at the local and the EU level, mainstreaming is more often 
framed in terms of super-diversity. We found that this even applies to cities that are not super-diverse 
in the theoretical sense, such as Warsaw. 
Furthermore, at the national level mainstreaming appears driven in particular by political 
factors and by the need for austerity measures and, in some cases, by government retrenchment. The 
politicization of migrant integration appears to have created a setting, especially in the ‘old’ 
immigration countries, where group-specific measures are less politically desirable. Furthermore, the 
economic crisis has prompted governments to cut integration spending, which might explain why 
diversity orientation is less manifest at the national level. Mainstreaming may then become a vehicle 
for decentralisation (UK and to some extent France), or retrenchment (the Netherlands). In contrast, 
at the local level, problem pressure seems to have been a more important engine behind 
mainstreaming. In some cases this relates to focus events or incidents that revealed the need for a 
more comprehensive approach to diversity, while in others the recognition of the super-diverse 
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Mainstreaming and proxy-policies 
 
However, the discrepancy that we found between the diversity-sensitive ways of mainstreaming at the 
EU and local levels and the more politicized and austerity-driven mainstreaming at the national level 
needs, have to be nuanced when looking at the widespread formulation of ‘proxy-policies.’ This applied 
to both policy areas under study in UPSTREAM; education as well as social cohesion. Proxy policies 
mostly involve needs-based or area-based measures that may still primarily target migrants, albeit 
indirectly. Especially in the UK and the Netherlands, area-based mainstreaming involves policy 
strategies targeting neighbourhoods that are often home to a high proportion of migrants, rather than 
targeting migrant groups per se. Such a strategy can also be uncovered in the French approach to 
Urban Priority Zones, the Dutch approach to ‘krachtwijken’ and the Spanish approach to Area Renewal 
Programs. A clear example of a needs-based proxy strategy can be found in the Dutch case, where 
parents’ educational level replaced parents’ ethnic background as the basis for financing primary 
education. Also in the EU case there is a clear focus on specific needs or barriers that may be 
disproportionally felt by migrants, such as early school leaving, access to services, etc. 
Although our analysis shows that such ‘proxy policies’ are clearly at the heart of the 
mainstreaming of integration governance (to be examined in more depth in work package 4 of the 
UPSTREAM project), we also found that in many cases we cannot speak of ‘replacement strategies’ in 
the pure sense. As conceptualized by De Zwart (2005), replacement strategies involve the deliberate 
development of proxy strategies that target migrant groups without mentioning them explicitly. 
However, in various cases, such as the EU case in particular, we did not find evidence that proxy policies 
were being designed with vulnerable migrant groups in mind. Also in France, the presence of migrants 
does not play an explicit role in the definition of Urban Priority Zones. This may signal that 
mainstreaming by introducing proxies can contribute to diluting integration policy preferences. In 
some cases, especially in the Netherlands and to some extent the UK, we found evidence that proxies 
were deliberately defined as a replacement for group-specific measures. In the Netherlands, the 
availability of ethnic statistics played a key role, especially at the national level, in calibrating area- 
based and needs-based policies (such as the financing of schools) in terms of how effective they are 
in addressing migrant-related issues. 
 
Challenges to effective integration governance 
 
This analysis of the politics of mainstreaming integration governance identified several challenges in 
terms of the potential effectiveness and impact of mainstreaming, which will need to be examined in 
more depth in the following report on the practice of mainstreaming. First of all, the trend of poly- 
centric governance dramatically enhances the complexity of integration governance. What are the 
consequences of the discrepancy between mainstreaming with a diversity orientation at the local and 
EU level and without this orientation at the national level; does this lead to decoupling? 
Furthermore, governance literature shows that in complex settings, maintaining a coherent 
policy message and communicating policy aims within policy networks are of the utmost importance: 
to what extent does mainstreaming integration governance involve such a coherent message and 
communication, or does it risk dilution of integration policy altogether? Regarding generic policies, it 
is the question to what extent these manage to reach out to specifically vulnerable groups; is 
mainstreaming something that works in particular for second generation migrants, and are specific 
policies still required for specific groups and for first generation migrants in particular? 
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Finally, an important issue that emerged concerns the presence or absence of ethnic statistics. 
Although this did not appear as an explanatory factor for the presence or absence of mainstreaming, 
it may constitute an important factor in the implementation of mainstreaming, as the presence of 
ethnic statistics could help monitor the group-specific impact of generic policies.
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